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INTRODUCTION 
We now have forty years of experience under the “death belt” in 
South Carolina. The Supreme Court of the United States approved new 
death sentencing schemes in 19761 and the death penalty has been in 
business more or less full time in the Palmetto State since then.2 Last 
year, two Justices of the Supreme Court called for full briefing on the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in light of forty years of data that 
demonstrate the death penalty statutes enacted in the 1970s have not 
lived up to constitutional demands.3 In this Article, we will report and 
comment on the results of four decades of—in Justice Blackmun’s 
words—“tinker[ing] with the machinery of death”4 in South Carolina. 
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1.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2.  As will be described in more detail in the next section of this Article, in 1974, South
Carolina enacted a mandatory death penalty statute that was deemed unconstitutional in 1976, 
but a new statute was almost immediately enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor. 
See infra notes 13, 23–24 and accompanying text.  
3.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Ginsburg).  
4.  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial
of certiorari). In 2002, after twenty-five years with the current death penalty statute, one of the 
authors published a similar report of the status of South Carolina’s death penalty. John H. Blume, 
Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the “Modern” Era 
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285 (2002).  
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It is not a pretty picture, and our bottom line is that the arbitrariness 
that led the Supreme Court to invalidate the death penalty in 1972 is 
still very much alive today. We will begin with a brief history of South 
Carolina’s “modern” death penalty system. 
I.  THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN ERA 
In Furman v. Georgia, a bare 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court 
invalidated all then-existing death penalty statutes.5 Each of the 
Justices in the majority wrote separately, and no clear consensus 
emerged as to why the death penalty, which had been upheld against 
constitutional attack just the year before,6 was now unconstitutional. At 
the risk of oversimplification, the constitutional rub arose from the fact 
that the death penalty was imposed in only a fraction of cases in which 
it was legally available and the Justices could divine no rational basis 
explaining why some offenders were sentenced to death while others 
were spared.7 For this reason, the Court found that all state systems of 
capital punishment allowed for arbitrary and capricious imposition of 
capital punishment.8 Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion captures 
this sentiment: “When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial 
number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is 
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it 
smacks of little more than a lottery system.”9 There was, in short, no 
“rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who die 
from the many who go to prison.”10 The fear that racial discrimination 
 
 5.  408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
 6.  See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 193 (1971) (rejecting the argument that the 
absence of standards to guide jury’s discretion in death penalty sentencing was “fundamentally 
lawless” and violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 7.  In most pre-Furman schemes, including South Carolina’s, the jury decided the issue of 
the defendant’s guilt and the appropriateness of the death penalty in the same unitary proceeding. 
See S.C. CODE § 16-52 (Michie 1962), invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010)). If the jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder, it would recommend mercy if it thought a life sentence was appropriate and would not 
recommend mercy if it favored death. Id.  
 8.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“Because of the uniqueness of the death 
penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a 
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”). 
 9.  Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 10.  Id. at 294. Justice Stewart echoed Justice Brennan’s concerns: “These death sentences 
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. . . . I 
simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a 
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and 
freakishly imposed.” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White voiced similar objections 
to imposing capital punishment, stating, “the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even 
for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases 
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played a significant role in the death selection process was also of grave 
concern to several members of the Court.11 The primary flaw in the 
statutes before the Court creating the intolerable arbitrariness was that 
jurors had complete and unguided discretion in deciding whether a 
capital defendant should receive the death penalty or life in prison.12 
Many states, including South Carolina, rushed to create capital 
sentencing schemes that would satisfy the new constitutional 
standard.13 The post-Furman statutes fell into two broad categories: 
mandatory death penalty statutes and guided discretion statutes. Both 
types of new death penalty laws were intended to reduce the role of 
jury discretion. The mandatory statutes did so by eliminating it; if a 
defendant was found guilty of a capital offense, then the death penalty 
was imposed—no ifs, ands, or buts. The guided discretion statutes 
attempted to reduce arbitrariness by creating new procedures. The 
central features of most guided discretion schemes included bifurcated 
trial (separating the issues of guilt-or-innocence and punishment), the 
creation of statutory aggravating circumstances limiting eligibility for 
capital punishment, permitting consideration of mitigating 
circumstances, and mandatory appellate review (including 
proportionality review). By 1976, the new laws made their way back to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court upheld the guided discretion 
statutes, but concluded that the mandatory statutes violated the Eighth 
Amendment.14 
 
in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 11.  See, e.g., id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (opining it was “incontestable that the death 
penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, 
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for 
the play of such prejudices”). Justice Marshall agreed, stating “It is immediately apparent that 
Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the 
population.” Id. at 364–65 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 12.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“Furman mandates that where discretion 
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life 
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited as to minimize 
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”). The South Carolina Supreme Court, 
following Furman, struck down the South Carolina statute in State v. Gibson, 259 S.C. 459, 462 
(1972). 
 13.  See State v. Rogers, 270 S.C. 285, 288, 242 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1978)  
 14.  The Court granted certiorari in five cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt 
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), involved guided discretion 
statutes of various types that were deemed constitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), involved mandatory statutes that were 
invalidated. While beyond the scope of this article, the Texas statute was (and is) a “hybrid” 
falling somewhere between guided discretion and mandatory in classification and most 
commentators assert, and we agree, if the Supreme Court had it to do over again they would have 
invalidated the Texas statute in 1976 as well. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh: The 
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Gregg v. Georgia was the lead case. Justice Stewart’s opinion stated, 
“[d]espite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over 
the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that a 
large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an 
appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.”15 Thus, the Court 
concluded the death penalty was not per se violative of the Eighth 
Amendment. The Georgia statute passed constitutional muster even 
though “some jury discretion still exists” because “‘the discretion to be 
exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce 
non-discriminatory application.”‘16 The Court concluded: 
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of 
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be 
met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing 
authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general 
proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides 
for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is 
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence 
and provided with standards to guide its use of the information.17 
The Court also emphasized the importance of appellate review: 
As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and 
caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic 
appeal of all death sentences to the State’s Supreme Court. That 
court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and 
determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is 
disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar 
cases.18 
The mandatory statutes, on the other hand, did not fare so well. In 
Woodson v. North Carolina,19 the Court reasoned that such statutes 
were out of step with “contemporary” standards of decency because 
 
Hazards of Predicting the Future, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES (John H. Blume & Jordan M. 
Steiker eds., 2010). In 2011, after his retirement from the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said 
that he would change only one vote from his tenure, his vote in Jurek: “I think upon reflection, 
we should have held the Texas statute . . . to fit under the mandatory category and be 
unconstitutional. In my judgment we made a mistake in that case.” EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD 
JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 439–40 
(2013) 
 15.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. 
 16.  Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).  
 17.  Id. at 195.  
 18.  Id. at 198. 
 19.  428 U.S. 280 (1976).  
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they eliminated the jury’s essential role in maintaining a “link” 
between “community values” and the capital punishment system.20 The 
Court also believed that the mandatory statutes only “papered over” 
the problem of unguided and unchecked discretion because juries 
would refuse to convict many defendants of murder if forced with such 
a Draconian choice.21 Due to the uniqueness of the death penalty, the 
Court held the Constitution required that the sentencer could not be 
precluded from considering the “character and record of the individual 
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.”22 
Since South Carolina had initially bet on the wrong constitutional 
horse by enacting a mandatory capital punishment scheme,23 the South 
Carolina Supreme Court was forced to find the mandatory statute 
invalid.24 In 1977, the General Assembly passed the current death 
penalty statue,25 which closely modeled the Georgia law approved by 
the High Court in Gregg.26 
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the new statute in State 
v. Shaw.27 The court concluded that the “statutory death penalty 
complex adopted by the General Assembly . . . is constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the statutory complex approved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Gregg.”28 In the state court’s opinion, the new 
procedures “focus the sentencing authorities’ attention on the 
particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics 
of the individual defendant.”29 This guidance sufficiently reduced the 
likelihood of the death penalty being imposed capriciously.30 The court 
also noted that the statutorily mandated appellate review, including the 
 
 20.  Id. at 295.  
 21.  Id. at 302. 
 22.  Id. at 304.  
 23.  See S.C. CODE § 16-52 (Michie 1962), invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) (current version at S.C. CODE § 16-3-20 (2010)).  
 24.  State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 239, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1976) (“As our statute does not 
permit the exercise of controlled discretion in imposing the death penalty required by the recent 
decision . . . it too is constitutionally defective.”). 
 25.  See 1977 Act No. 177 § 1 (effective June 8, 1977).  
 26.  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162–68 (describing Georgia’s death penalty sentencing scheme). 
There have been no substantial changes to the South Carolina death penalty statute in the last 
forty years; however, the number of statutory aggravating circumstances has grown significantly, 
see infra text accompanying notes 173–74, and a capital defendant’s parole eligibility (if the 
sentencer chooses the life option) has been extended from twenty years to thirty years and then 
eliminated. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2010). 
 27.  273 S.C. 194, 205, 255 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1979). 
 28.  Id. at 203, 255 S.E.2d at 803–04. 
 29.  Id., 255 S.E.2d at 804.  
 30.  Id.  
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requirement that the court determine whether the death sentence was 
disproportionate or excessive, served “[as] an additional check against 
the random imposition of the death penalty.”31 
II.  POST-FURMAN AND GREGG DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS 
In the forty years since it approved the new death penalty schemes, 
the Supreme Court has enacted new limitations on the death penalty 
in an attempt to ensure the states impose death sentences in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional demands set out in Furman and 
Gregg. A theme in Furman and Gregg, reaffirmed repeatedly over the 
last forty years, is that capital punishment should be reserved for the 
most culpable offenders who commit the most heinous crimes. Justice 
Kennedy recently stated “the death penalty is reserved for a narrow 
category of crimes and offenders”32—for the “worst of the worst.”33 
This “worst of the worst” principle influenced the Court in Gregg to 
conclude that the death penalty was not disproportionate in all cases 
because while “[i]t is an extreme sanction, [it is] suitable to the most 
extreme of crimes.”34 Since Gregg, the Court has made clear that capital 
punishment should be “reserved for those crimes that are ‘so grievous 
an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the 
penalty of death.’”35 
The commitment to reserve capital punishment for the “worst of 
the worst” and conversely to prevent “average murderers” from being 
sentenced to death manifests itself in two discrete areas of the Court’s 
capital punishment jurisprudence. First, the Court “has consistently 
confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of 
the most serious crimes.”36 Thus the death penalty may not be imposed 
 
 31.  Id. at 211, 255 S.E. 2d at 807.  
 32.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 33.  In Furman, Justice Brennan found that the low levels of infliction of capital punishment 
made it “highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst 
crimes are selected for this punishment.” 408 U.S. 238, 293–94 (Brennan, J., concurring). In fact, 
he noted that if “Furman or his crime illustrates the ‘extreme,’ then nearly all murderers and their 
murders are also ‘extreme.’” Id. at 294. 
 34.  428 U.S. at 187. The Court further found the death penalty served the penological goal, 
or social purpose, of retribution when imposed for the worst crimes: 
Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is 
an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront 
to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. 
Id. at 184. 
 35.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 187).  
 36.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
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for non-homicide offenses.37 Even for those found guilty of murder, the 
requirement that a state prove an aggravating circumstance before a 
defendant is eligible to be sentenced to death is intended to provide the 
required narrowing and reserve the sentence for only the worst or most 
extreme murders. Thus states are required to “give narrow and precise 
definition to the aggravating factors that can result in a capital 
sentence.”38 Furthermore, it is not enough that an aggravating 
circumstance “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty,” it must also “reasonably justify the imposition of a more 
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of 
murder.”39 Where the state fails to narrowly and precisely define an 
aggravating circumstance, it “fail[s] adequately to channel the 
sentencing decision” as required by Gregg.40 As a result, the Court has 
invalidated aggravating circumstances broadly defined to allow the 
imposition of the death penalty upon a defendant whose “crimes 
cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more 
‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder.”41 
The Court has also prohibited the imposition of the death penalty 
on those deemed less culpable than the worst offender, holding that its 
“narrowing jurisprudence . . . seeks to ensure that only the most 
deserving of execution are put to death.”42 In order to do so, the Court 
requires that “[i]n any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to 
raise as a mitigating factor ‘any aspect of [his or her] character or record 
. . . as a basis for a sentence less than death.”43 The Court has also barred 
the imposition of the death penalty on certain individuals deemed 
categorically undeserving of the death penalty. In Enmund v. Florida44 
and Tison v. Arizona,45 for example, the Court held that persons guilty 
 
 37.  Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for the rape 
of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (prohibiting the imposition of the death 
penalty for felony murder where the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for the 
rape of an adult woman). 
 38.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 39.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 40.  See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 433 (1980). 
 41.  Id. at 433. In Godfrey, the Court considered the Georgia aggravating circumstance that 
made a murder found to be “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” death eligible. 
The Court found “[a] person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder 
as ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.’” Id. at 428–29.  
 42.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 43.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).  
 44.  458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
 45.  481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
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of murder as an accessory but who did not actually kill could only be 
sentenced to death if they were major participants in the criminal 
offense and showed deliberate indifference to human life. Then, in 
Atkins v. Virginia, the Court created a categorical bar to execution for 
persons with intellectual disability (formerly classified as mental 
retardation), finding, “[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is 
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, 
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not 
merit that form of retribution.”46 Several years later, the Court similarly 
found that juvenile offenders “cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders” and barred the execution of offenders who 
committed a crime before turning eighteen in Roper v. Simmons.47 
In a similar vein, the Court has attempted to eliminate other forms 
of arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty, particularly 
arbitrariness resulting from racial discrimination. Multiple justices in 
Furman based their decision, at least in part, on the fact that the death 
penalty was disproportionately imposed on African Americans.48 Since 
then, the Court has “engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial 
prejudice” in the administration of capital punishment and the criminal 
justice system as a whole.49 For example, the Court has prohibited the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty on the 
basis of race,50 prohibited racially biased prosecutorial arguments,51 
prohibited prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges to 
potential jurors on the basis of race,52 and allowed defendants in capital 
cases to ask potential jurors about any racial biases they might harbor.53 
The attempts of the Court to make the death penalty’s 
administration more reliable and less arbitrary have been largely 
unsuccessful. These failures have led former and current members of 
the Court who once supported capital punishment to question whether 
its attempts to regulate death were worth the candle. Justice Lewis 
 
 46.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.  
 47.  543 U.S. at 569.  
 48.  See supra note 11.  
 49.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987). 
 50.  Id. at 309 n.30 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 
 51.  Id. (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 
 52.  Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).  
 53.  Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986). Recognizing that the modern statutes 
continue to leave death sentences to the jury, the Court found capital sentencing proceedings are 
particularly susceptible to racial discrimination: “Because of the range of discretion entrusted to 
a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate 
but remain undetected.” Id. at 35.  
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Powell, for example, said after his retirement that if he could change 
one vote during his 15-year career as a Supreme Court Justice it would 
be his decision to uphold the Georgia death penalty in the face of 
strong evidence of racial discrimination.54 Justice Powell later 
expressed that he had “come to think that capital punishment should 
be abolished” and it “serves no useful purpose.”55 Justice Harry 
Blackmun concluded late in his career that the Court’s efforts to curb 
capital punishment’s flaws had been an abject failure and, as noted 
previously in this article, stated he would no longer “tinker with the 
machinery of death.”56 Justice John Paul Stevens has made clear that 
he finds the death penalty is an irreparably flawed government 
program.57 And most recently, Justice Stephen Breyer, called for full 
briefing on the constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole.58 In his 
dissenting opinion in a recent case involving lethal injection protocols, 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, stated: 
In 1976, the Court thought that the constitutional infirmities in the 
death penalty could be healed; the Court in effect delegated 
significant responsibility to the States to develop procedures that 
would protect against those constitutional problems. Almost 40 
years of studies, surveys, and experience strongly indicate, however, 
that this effort has failed. Today’s administration of the death 
penalty involves three fundamental constitutional defects: (1) 
serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, and (3) 
unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty’s 
penological purpose. Perhaps as a result, (4) most places within the 
United States have abandoned its use.59 
According to Justice Breyer, the first three considerations—
unreliability, arbitrariness, and delays—make the punishment cruel; the 
abandonment of the practice makes it unusual.60 Justice Breyer found 
that these unresolved and unresolvable issues make it “highly likely 
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment” and tasked 
 
 54.  John Jeffries, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 451–53 (2001) (reporting that 
Justice Powell said in 1991 that he would change his vote in McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279). 
 55.  MANDERY, supra note 14, at 438.  
 56.  Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari).  
 57.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that though it 
did not “justify a refusal to respect precedents,” based on his own experience, “the imposition of 
the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes’”).  
 58.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 59.  Id. at 2755–56. 
 60.  Id. at 2756–73. 
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litigators to raise these issues with the Court.61 Given Justice Breyer’s 
directive, the next section of this Article assesses South Carolina’s 
death penalty in light of his constitutional concerns. 
III.  THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEATH PENALTY BY THE NUMBERS 
A.  An Overview of Forty Years of Death Sentences and Executions 
Before directly addressing Justice Breyer’s reasons questioning the 
constitutional legitimacy of capital punishment, we will “set the table” 
by providing an overview of what forty years of death in South Carolina 
has “produced.” As of December 31, 2015, forty-four men, and no 
women, wait to die on South Carolina’s death row.62 Despite the fact 
that African Americans comprise only 28% of the state’s population,63 
twenty-six of the death row inmates (59%) are black.64 One death row 
inmate is Hispanic (2%) and seventeen are white (39%).65 Seventeen 
of the twenty-six African American inmates (65%), the Hispanic 
inmate (100%), and fifteen of the seventeen white inmates (88%) were 
convicted of murdering one or more white victims.66 The men currently 
on death row have been there for an average of 14.5 years, and no 
executions are expected for at least the next several years. As of the 
publication date of this Article, nine of the individuals currently on 
death row have been granted relief, either in the form of a complete 
retrial or a new sentencing hearing, and are currently awaiting that new 
proceeding or the grant of relief has been appealed by the State.67 
In the “modern era” of capital punishment, 180 men and 1 woman 
have been sentenced to death.68 Ninety-three (51%) of the 181 people 
 
 61.  Id. at 2776–77. Justice Breyer’s call to arms is not unprecedented. In 1963, Justice Arthur 
Goldberg filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 
U.S. 889 (1963), stating he thought the Court should consider whether the death penalty for the 
crime of rape violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Goldberg’s dissent fueled the 
litigation that resulted in Furman. 
 62.  Appendix B to this Article lists the forty-four inmates on South Carolina’s death row as 
of December 31, 2015.  
 63.  Calculated using population as of 2010. South Carolina Population by Race and Hispanic 
Origin (1980-2010), SOUTH CAROLINA REVENUE AND FISCAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, 
http://abstract.sc.gov/chapter14/pop12.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).  
 64.  See infra Appendix B.  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id.  
 67.  See infra Appendix B. For more on the errors found in these and other cases, see infra 
Section IV.B.  
 68.  Appendix A to this Article lists all individuals sentenced to death in South Carolina 
from 1977 through 2015 with information about their race, the victim(s)’s race, and the county of 
conviction. Though this Article analyzes the forty years of South Carolina’s post-Furman modern 
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to receive a death sentence were white, eighty-six (48%) were African 
American, one (.55%) was Hispanic, and one (.55%) was Native 
American.69 Our statistical calculations based on the total number of 
death sentences use 187 death sentences because we have counted six 
of the 181 individuals as receiving two death sentences, either for 
murders committed in two different counties or individual sentences 
for multiple victims within the same county.70 
There have been forty-three executions in South Carolina since 
1976,71 the most recent of which occurred on May 6, 2011 when Jeffrey 
Motts waived his future appeals and was executed by lethal injection.72 
Only eight states have executed more death-sentenced inmates.73 All 
those executed were men; twenty-six (60%) were white, sixteen (37%) 
were black, and one (2%) was Native American.74 Ten of the executions 
were carried out on “volunteers” who, like Motts, waived their available 
appeals in order to be executed.75 
 
 
death penalty, the sentencing data do not include death sentences under the 1974 death penalty 
statute, which was ultimately deemed unconstitutional and would skew the statistics drawn from 
the sentencing data.  
 69.  See infra Appendix A. 
 70.  See id. (indicating Ronald Woomer, Larry Gene Bell, Richard Longworth, James 
Tucker, Thomas Ivey, and Stephen Stanko received two death sentences each). In practice, most 
defendants convicted of murdering multiple victims receive a death sentence for each victim; 
however, it is not always readily apparent whether a defendant received a death sentence for each 
murder victim. Therefore, the authors have only counted multiple death sentences only where 
court records explicitly indicate the defendant received multiple death sentences.  
 71.  Appendix C to this Article lists those individuals executed in South Carolina since the 
state reinstated the death penalty in 1974. The last execution in South Carolina prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman was in 1962. From 1912 to 1962, South Carolina executed 
241 persons. Bruce L. Pearson, Why the Death Penalty is at Issue, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
SOUTH CAROLINA: OUTLOOK FOR THE 1980S 9 (Bruce L. Pearson ed., 1981). 
 72.  See infra Appendix C. As South Carolina law currently stands, the condemned inmate 
is allowed to choose the method of execution, either lethal injection or electrocution. See S.C. 
Code § 24-3-530. If the inmate does not make an election, the execution method will default to 
lethal injection if he was sentenced after 1995 or to electrocution if he was sentenced before 1995. 
Id. § 24-3-530(B), (C).  
 73.  Those states are Texas (524), Oklahoma (112), Virginia (110), Florida (90), Missouri 
(83), Alabama (56), Georgia (57), and Ohio (53). Number of Executions by State and Region Since 
1976, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-
executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). North Carolina has executed the 
same number of death-sentenced inmates as South Carolina in the modern era. Id.  
 74.  See infra Appendix D.  
 75.  See infra Appendix D. Eight of the ten volunteers were white males. See id. For a more 
detailed discussion of “volunteers,” see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide 
and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005). 
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B.  Cruel—Lack of Reliability 
Justice Breyer found a lack of reliability evidenced by 
exonerations, studies showing convincing evidence that innocent 
people have been executed, and in the overall error rates in capital 
cases.76 Error plagues the administration of the death penalty in South 
Carolina. Most people sentenced to death in South Carolina are 
ultimately removed from death row for reasons other than their 
execution. 
Figure 1: Outcome of death sentences 
Eighty-four men and one woman who were sentenced to death are 
no longer on death row because their conviction and/or sentence were 
subsequently overturned during the capital appeals process.77 Three 
 
 76.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756–59 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 77.  See infra Appendix A.  
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were acquitted at retrials.78 Eighty-two were sentenced to life 
imprisonment or a term of years after a new trial or a plea bargain.79 
Thus, approximately 47% of those individuals who were sentenced to 
death in the modern era of capital punishment were subsequently 
determined to be either not guilty, guilty of a lesser offense, or 
deserving of a sentence less than death. By contrast, only 24% of those 
sentenced to death have been executed. 
During the modern era of the death penalty, three South Carolina 
men sentenced to death had their convictions overturned and were 
subsequently acquitted of murder charges at their retrials80—Michael 
Linder,81 Jessie Keith Brown,82 and Warren D. Manning.83 Joseph Ard 
was also released from prison after a jury found he did not intentionally 
kill his girlfriend and their unborn child, and thus, was guilty only of 
manslaughter.84 Another former death row inmate, Edward Lee 
Elmore, was released after strong evidence of his innocence emerged 
resulting in his conviction being vacated.85 Other former death row 
inmates who have subsequently been released from prison, e.g. Sterling 
 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Linder was convicted and sentenced to death in 1979 for the killing of a police officer. 
After his conviction was overturned, new ballistics evidence confirmed Linder’s self-defense 
theory and he was acquitted. State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981); DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE CASES, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
innocence-cases (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).  
 82.  After his convictions for armed robbery and murder were twice overturned, evidence 
was presented that Brown’s half-brother actually committed the murder and the jury acquitted 
Brown of murder charges. State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986); State v. Brown, 
296 S.C. 191, 371 S.E.2d 523 (1988); ‘Devastated’ by Verdict, Victim’s Family Rips Jury, 
SPARTANBURG HERALD J. Jan. 16, 1989, at A1, available at 
http://www.goupstate.com/article/19890116/NEWS/901160312.  
 83.  On the state’s fifth attempt to obtain a conviction against Manning (Manning’s 
conviction was overturned twice and two mistrials were declared before the state prosecuted 
Manning for a fifth time), the jury acquitted Manning of the 1989 slaying of a police officer. State 
v. Manning, 329 S.C. 1, 495 S.E.2d 191 (1997); State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 
(1991); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE CASES, http://www.deathpenalt 
yinfo.org/innocence-cases. 
 84.  John Monk, Inmate Goes from Death Row to Freedom, POST & COURIER, Jul. 31, 2012, 
available at http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120731/PC16/120739886/1005/inmate-goes-
from-death-row-to-freedom; see also Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 336, 642 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2007).  
 85.  Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011); see also RAYMOND BONNER, ANATOMY 
OF INJUSTICE: A MURDER CASE GONE WRONG (2012). 
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Spann86 and Ernest Riddle,87 had their sentences reduced due to their 
likely innocence. 
Unreliability also occurs when individuals are erroneously 
sentenced to death, i.e. when the “courts failed to follow legally 
required procedures” in capital cases.88 Over the last forty years, error 
has been found in more than sixty percent of all South Carolina death 
penalty trials in the course of the appellate and post-conviction review 
process mandated by the South Carolina death penalty scheme, 
including: (1) direct appeal,89 (2) state post-conviction relief 
proceedings,90 (3) federal habeas corpus,91 and, (4) state habeas 
corpus.92 For the purposes of this Article, “error” is defined as “an 
error occurring at trial serious enough to warrant a new trial either as 
to the defendant’s guilt or as to the appropriate punishment.” We have 
not counted cases in which a reviewing court found trial error but 
nevertheless concluded that the error was harmless.93 
The South Carolina Supreme Court has reviewed 227 death 
judgments94 in connection with the first mandatory, or “direct,” appeal 
and has granted new trials or resentencing proceedings in eighty-one 
cases, for an error rate of 36%.95 The Supreme Court of the United 
 
 86.  After seventeen years on death row, Spann accepted an Alford plea when his conviction 
was overturned based on newly discovered evidence of innocence. He was paroled in 2006. See 
State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 513 S.E.2d 98 (1999); Keith Morrison, A 20-Year Quest for Freedom, 
NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19161103/ns/dateline_nbc-crime_reports/t/-year-quest-
freedom/#.VrojglgrKHs.  
 87.  After twenty-one years on death row, Riddle pled no contest after his conviction was 
overturned based on the fact that the State failed to turn over evidence calling into question the 
credibility of the main witness against Riddle. Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 28, 631 S.E.2d 70 (2006); 
Tim Gulla, Ernest Riddle of Death Row, GAFFNEY LEDGER, Sept. 19, 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2011-09-19/Front_Page/Ernest_Riddle_off_death_row.html. 
Riddle was sentenced to thirty years in prison and was released in 2015.  
 88.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2758–59 (2015).  
 89.  S.C. Code § 16-2-25(A) (“Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the 
judgment becoming final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina.”). 
 90.  S.C. Code § 17-27-160 (setting forth the procedures for post-conviction review in capital 
cases).  
 91.  28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing for federal court review of state criminal convictions). 
 92.  Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 467–68, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990). 
 93.  See, e.g., State v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252, 265, 741 S.E.2d 708, 715 (2013) (finding improper 
jury instruction harmless); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 123, 326 S.E.2d 132, 143 (1985) (finding 
improper malice jury instruction was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 94.  The number of cases reviewed is greater than the total number of individuals sentenced 
to death because some individuals were again sentenced to death after their original sentence was 
overturned, requiring the appellate review process to begin anew. Two death sentences have not 
yet been reviewed on direct appeal. Appendix E to this Article lists all cases reviewed on direct 
appeal by the South Carolina Supreme Court.  
 95.  See infra Appendix E. In forty-one cases, the court granted an entire new trial. In thirty-
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States found error in nine cases affirmed by the state supreme court,96 
for an overall error rate on direct appeal of 39%.97 
The types of error detected in the direct appeal cases can be 
broadly categorized.98 The three largest categories of error are 
instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, and evidentiary error.99 
In twenty-nine cases (13% of all cases decided on direct appeal), 
prosecutorial misconduct was a reason, if not the sole reason, for 
reversal.100 In forty-five cases (21%), there was prejudicial error in the 
 
nine cases, the court ordered a new sentencing trial. In one case, the court vacated the death 
sentence because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the crime, resulting in an 
unconstitutional death sentence under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The direct appeal 
affirmance rate in capital cases in South Carolina increased significantly after the 1994 election of 
Attorney General Charles Condon, due in part to his making death penalty appeals a political 
issue. Part of Condon’s campaign involved criticizing the South Carolina Supreme Court for its 
record in capital cases. See John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty 
Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 474–75 (1999). Between 
1977 and 1994, the affirmance rate on direct appeal was only 50%. Between 1994 and 2014, the 
affirmance rate increased to 78%. See infra Appendix E. The national error rate on direct appeal 
as found by a study of all death sentences between 1973 and 1995 was 41%. James S. Liebman, et 
al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1847 (2000). 
A more recent study determined that approximately 38% of all death sentences between 1973 
and 2003, nationally, have been overturned at some point during the appellate process. Frank R. 
Baumgartner & Anna W. Dietrich, Most Death Penalty Sentences are Overturned. Here’s Why 
That Matters, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ monkey-
cage/wp/2015/03/17/most-death-penalty-sentences-are-overturned-heres-why-that-matters/.  
 96.  See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 
246 (2002); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 
(1994); Patterson v. South Carolina, 493 U.S. 1013 (1990) (order); Jones v. South Carolina, 476 
U.S. 1102 (1986) (order); Plemmons v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1102 (order); Elmore v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1101 (1986) (order); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).  
 97.  The error rate would likely be substantially higher if the South Carolina Supreme Court 
had not jettisoned in favorem vitae (in favor of life) review. For two hundred years, errors could 
be raised on direct appeal in capital cases even if there was no objection at trial. However, in State 
v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60–69, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324–28 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Toal, J., 
concurring), the court determined that the in favorem vitae rule was outdated and, despite the 
absence of evidence to support the assertion, it encouraged “sandbagging” by defense counsel. 
The reversal rate on direct appeal prior to Torrence was 51% (in fifty of ninety-nine cases, the 
state supreme court granted either an entire new trial or a new sentencing trial). After Torrence, 
the reversal rate fell to 24% (error was found in 31 of 127 cases). See infra Appendix E.  
 98.  Appendix F to this Article sets forth the errors found by category. 
 99.  Some cases had more than one error, and error of more than one type.  
 100.  Most of these cases involved improper prosecutorial argument. See, e.g., State v. 
Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222–23, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881–82 (2007) (reversing based on the 
prosecution’s improper statements during closing argument that he “expects” a death sentence 
and failure to return a death sentence would declare an “open season on babies in Lexington 
County”); State v. Cockerham, 294 S.C. 380, 381, 365, S.E.2d 22, 22–23 (1998) (reversing based 
on the prosecution’s improper reference to the defendant’s refusal to testify). However, other 
types of misconduct occurred as well. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 354 S.C. 390, 396, 581 S.E.2d 157, 
161 (2003) (reversing based on improper law enforcement contact with qualified juror family 
members).  
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trial court’s instructions to the jury.101 In forty-two cases (19%), there 
was evidentiary error, which for the purposes of this Article, refers to 
situations where the trial judge either admitted improper prejudicial 
evidence or excluded relevant admissible evidence.102 Most, but not all, 
detected errors fit into these categories.103 It is also important to note a 
type of error that has never been found. The South Carolina Supreme 
Court has never determined that any death sentence was 
disproportionate to the offense.104 
Error was found in an additional fifty cases in the post-direct 
appeal capital collateral appeals process.105 Overall, when factoring in 
state post-conviction appeals, motions for new trial due to newly 
discovered evidence, federal habeas corpus, and state habeas corpus 
140 of the 233 death sentences imposed in South Carolina have been 
 
 101.  See, e.g., State v. Cottrell, 376 S.C. 260, 265, 657 S.E.2d 451, 453–54 (2008) (reversing 
based on failure to give voluntary manslaughter instruction). Other cases involved the trial court 
giving the jury a legally incorrect instruction. See, e.g., State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 417, 409 
S.E.2d 372, 374–75 (1991) (reversing based on incorrect reasonable doubt instruction).  
 102.  See, e.g., State v. Jones, 383 S.C. 535, 550, 681 S.E.2d 580, 588 (2009) (reversing because 
the trial court improperly admitted barefoot insole impression evidence); State v. Burkhart, 371 
S.C. 482, 488, 640 S.E.2d 450, 453 (2007) (reversing based on admission of improper prison 
condition evidence). 
 103.  See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 37, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014) (reversing based on 
the trial judge’s use of an improper standard in determining whether the defendant was competent 
to waive his right to counsel); State v. Rivera, 402 S.C. 225, 249, 741 S.E.2d 694, 707 (2013) 
(reversing based on a violation of the defendant’s right to testify at trial); State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 
412, 417, 608 S.E.2d 429, 432 (2005) (reversing based on improper comments made by the trial 
judge during a guilty plea). 
 104.  See infra notes 254–56 and accompanying text.  
 105.  Appendix G to this Article lists the forty-two post-conviction relief cases where error 
was found in the South Carolina courts. In four other cases the Supreme Court of the United 
States found prejudicial error following the state court’s post-conviction review. See Yates v. 
Aiken, 500 U.S. 391, 393 (1991); Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 527 (1987) (per curiam); Koon 
v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 943, 943 (1987) (order); Patterson v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 943, 943 (1987) (order). 
In one case a motion for new trial was granted due to newly discovered evidence of actual 
innocence. See State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 621–22, 513 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1999). In State v. South, 
310 S.C. 504, 509, 427 S.E.2d 666, 670 (1993), the trial judge granted a new sentencing trial based 
on newly discovered evidence that the defendant had a brain tumor at the time of the offense. On 
appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the judge applied the wrong standard 
and remanded the case for reconsideration. Id. Before the court could act on the case, South 
waived his appeals and was voluntarily executed. See infra Appendix D. In another case, a new 
trial was ordered in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405, 1410 (4th 
Cir. 1987). In two cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted a new trial after a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the court’s original jurisdiction. Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 
483, 485, 552 S.E.2d 712, 713 (2001); Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 467–68, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990). 
In two other cases, error was found in post-conviction proceedings, but the cases remain pending 
on appeal and have not been included in our reversal count. We also excluded one case in which 
a death-sentenced inmate was found incompetent to be executed. See Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 
75, 84, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1993). 
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reversed—an overall reversal rate of 60%.106 The error rate would 
certainly be higher if South Carolina capital cases were not reviewed 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.107 The Fourth Circuit has historically 
been the stingiest federal court of appeals when it comes to granting 
relief in capital cases.108 Capital habeas petitioners within the Fourth 
Circuit have prevailed in only 6.2% of cases.109 The overall success rate 
in other federal circuits over the same time period was 40%.110 Only 
one South Carolina capital federal habeas petitioner has ever obtained 
relief in the Fourth Circuit, and that was in 1987.111 
The most common type of error detected in post-conviction 
proceedings, not surprisingly, is the denial of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.112 Twenty-six of the fifty post-conviction 
reversals were due to various failings by counsel.113 Post-conviction 
relief has also been granted due to prosecutorial misconduct,114 
instructional error,115 evidentiary error,116 newly discovered evidence of 
 
 106.  Of the 187 original death sentences, 119 have resulted in at least one reversal prior to 
either the individual’s execution or a subsequent sentence of less than death—an error rate of 
65%. Nationally, error is found in 68% of all capital cases. Liebman, supra note 96, at 1850. 
 107.  The Fourth Circuit is the federal court of appeals for South Carolina as well as North 
Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia.  
 108.  John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) “No One Here Gets Out Alive”: The 
Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 465, 470–71 (2010).  
 109.  Id. at 469 n.27.  
 110.  Id. at 469 (citing James S. Lebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So 
Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It 9 (2002), 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf. 
 111.  See Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987). In 2011, the Fourth Circuit granted 
habeas relief in the case of former South Carolina death row inmate Edward Lee Elmore, whose 
death sentence had previously been vacated based on a finding he is intellectually disabled. 
Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 786, 872 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit found Elmore 
received ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed his conviction. Id. at 872. Elmore has since 
been released from prison. See infra Appendix A. For more information about Elmore’s case, 
conviction, and the errors that occurred in his case, see BONNER, supra note 85.  
 112.  See infra Appendix F.  
 113.  See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 388 S.C. 447, 698 S.E.2d 561 (2010) (reversing based on a 
finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper remarks during the 
solicitor’s sentencing phase closing argument); Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 642 S.E.2d 590 (2007) 
(reversing based on a finding that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and challenge 
gunshot residue evidence). The most common failing of counsel is the failure to adequately 
develop and present evidence in mitigation at the sentencing phase of trial. See, e.g., Weik v. State, 
409 S.C. 214, 761 S.E.2d 757 (2014); Rosemond v. Catoe, 383 S.C. 320, 680 S.E.2d 5 (2009); Council 
v. State, 380 S.C. 159, 690 S.E.2d 356 (2009).  
 114.  See, e.g., Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 631 S.E.2d 70 (2006) (reversing based on the 
prosecution’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence and failure to correct false testimony). 
 115.  See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 393 (1991) (reversing because of improper burden-
shifting instruction regarding implied malice).  
 116.  See, e.g., Chaffee v. State, 294 S.C. 88, 91, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987) (reversing because 
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actual innocence,117 and a death sentenced inmate’s mental 
incompetency to be executed.118 Additionally, though not considered 
error at the time of trial, many individuals have been removed from 
South Carolina’s death row because the Supreme Court later found 
they were categorically ineligible for the death penalty as a result of 
their age or intellectual capacity. Eight inmates were removed from 
South Carolina’s death row as a result of the Supreme Court decisions 
categorically barring the execution of juveniles119 and the intellectually 
disabled120––four as a result of each case. 
Finally, while executive clemency is not technically part of the 
judicial capital appeals process, it has traditionally been deemed to be 
an important failsafe in any capital punishment scheme.121 No South 
Carolina death row inmate has been granted clemency since the new 
death penalty statute has been in effect.122 This was not true prior to 
 
the judge did not allow evidence of adaptability to confinement). 
 117.  State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 621–22, 513 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1999) (reversing based on the 
trial judge’s rejection of exculpatory expert testimony at a new trial hearing). 
 118.  Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 84, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (1993) (finding incompetency based 
on the inmate’s complete inability to communicate).  
 119.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Eric Dale Morgan, Ted Power, Herman Hughes, 
and Robert Conyers’ sentences were vacated pursuant to Roper. See State v. Morgan, 367 S.C. 
615, 626 S.E.2d 888 (2006); infra Appendix G. Prior to Roper v. Simmons in 2005, barring the 
execution of juveniles under the age of eighteen, South Carolina executed James Terry Roach in 
1986 who was seventeen at the time of his crime. See infra Appendix G.; see also INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647 (1987), 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/86.87eng/EUU9647.htm. 
 120.  Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. Ricky George, Elis Franklin, Edward Lee Elmore, and Tommy 
Lee Davis’ sentences were vacated pursuant to Atkins. See infra Appendix G. Kenneth Simmons’s 
sentence was also vacated pursuant to Atkins; the state appealed. See Simmons v. State, No. 05-
CP-18-1368 (S.C. 1st Cir. C.P. Oct. 21, 2013). Simmons also appealed the court’s denial of a DNA-
based false evidence claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari on the Atkins 
claim, but is currently considering whether Simmons’s DNA claim warrants a new trial to 
determine his guilt or innocence. See Order, Simmons v. State, No. 2014.000387 (S.C. July 27, 
2015). In addition, two post-conviction relief courts have granted relief based on a finding that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of intellectual disability. 
See Evins v. State, No. 07-CP-42-2849 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. June 27, 2014); Mercer v. State, No. 09-
CP-32-5465 (S.C. 11th Cir. C.P. June 27, 2011). One has been resentenced to life without parole 
(Evins) and one is pending on resentencing (Mercer). Prior to Atkins, South Carolina executed 
at least two intellectually disabled persons—it was undisputed that both Sylvester Adams and 
Frank Middleton were intellectually disabled. There was also very strong evidence that Larry 
Gilbert was intellectually disabled.  
 121.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (stating “[e]xecutive clemency has provided 
the ‘fail safe’” in the capital punishment system) (citations omitted); see also Michael Heise, 
Mercy By the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239 
(2003) (exploring and criticizing interaction between executive clemency and capital 
punishment). 
 122.  Not all of the forty-three inmates who have been executed have requested clemency. In 
addition to the ten “volunteers,” at least three other inmates (Donald H. Gaskins, Ronnie 
Howard, and Anthony Green) elected not to ask the governor for a commutation.  
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Furman: we have identified at least twenty-seven death-sentenced 
individuals whose sentences were commuted through gubernatorial 
clemency in the forty years prior to Furman.123 No other state has 
executed so many inmates in the modern era without a single 
commutation.124 
C.  Cruel–Arbitrariness 
Forty years ago, the Supreme Court upheld new death penalty 
statutes only after finding they would prohibit the death penalty from 
being “inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”125 Justice 
Breyer found that “40 years of further experience make it increasingly 
clear that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily, i.e., without the 
‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to reconcile its use with the 
Constitution’s commands.”126 Arbitrariness, according to Justice 
Breyer, is demonstrated by the fact that “the factors that most clearly 
ought to affect application of the death penalty—namely, comparative 
egregiousness of the crime—often do not.”127 Instead, “circumstances 
that ought not to affect application of the death penalty, such as race, 
gender, or geography, often do.”128 Our research demonstrates the 
same is true in South Carolina—factors such as race, gender, and 
geography are greater determining factors in who receives the State’s 
ultimate penalty than factors such as the egregiousness of the crime. 
1.  Race and Gender Effects 
Of South Carolina’s 187 death sentences in the modern era, 151 
(81%) were imposed for the killing of a white victim.129 33 (18%) were 
imposed for the killing of an African American victim.130 Three (1%) 
death sentences were imposed for the killing of an Asian victim.131 
 
 123.  A list of the twenty-seven pre-Furman commutations is on file with the authors and was 
compiled by searching records maintained at the South Carolina Department of Archives & 
History.  
 124.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, CLEMENCY, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/clemency; see also supra note 73 (listing the states that have carried out the highest 
number of executions). 
 125.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 126.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 112 (1982)).  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  One hundred fifty-one of the 187 death sentences were imposed for the killing of one or 
more white victims; some were also charged with killing minority victims. See infra Appendix A. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id.  
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Figure 2: Death sentences by victim race 
 
Sixty-three (34%) of the sentences were imposed on an African 
American defendant convicted of killing a white victim.132 This is so 
despite the fact that it is far less common for a homicide to occur with 
a white victim/black defendant combination.133 Death sentencing rates 
show the disparity cannot be explained by the demographics of murder 
victims. For a black male134 defendant convicted of killing a white 
victim, the death sentencing rate is 8.56 per 100 murders as opposed to 
only 0.46 for black victims.135 White males are also sentenced to death 
 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s 
Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 192 (2004). 
 134.  Only male defendants were considered in calculating the following sentencing rates 
because only one female defendant was sentenced to death after Furman.  
 135.  Death sentencing rates were calculated by comparing the number of arrests for murder 
with the number of death sentences imposed, based on the demographics of the defendants and 
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at a higher rate for the killing of white victims (5.26 death sentences 
per 100 murders) compared to black victims (3.17 death sentences per 
100 murders).136 
 
 
Figure 3: Death sentences by race of defendant and victim 
  
 
the victims. Murder arrest data was obtained using the Supplementary Homicide Reports 
compiled by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data. Fox, James A., and Marc L. Swatt. 
Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary Homicide Reports With Multiple 
Imputation, Cumulative Files 1976-2007. ICPSR24801-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2009-02-24, available at 
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR24801.v1. Sentencing data can be found in Appendix A.  
 136.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. 
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The gender of the victim also has a noticeable effect on the ultimate 
outcome of a murder case in South Carolina. Ninety-eight (53%) of all 
death sentences were imposed for the killing of a female victim; the 
lone female defendant received a death sentence for killing a male 
victim.137 Though only 22% of all South Carolina murders involved a 
female victim,138 53% of the death sentences imposed, and 58% of the 
executions carried out, were female victim cases.139 Death sentencing 
rates are higher when the victim is female regardless of the defendant’s 
race. White male defendants convicted of killing female victims are 
sentenced to death at a rate of 4.89 per 100 murders, as opposed to only 
2.43 per 100 when the victim is male.140 The sentencing rate for black 
males convicted of killing female victims is 3.28 per 100 murders, as 
opposed to 0.98 per 100 for male victims.141 Considering both race and 
gender of the defendant and victim demonstrates that the most likely 
(by far) combination to result in a death sentence is a black male 
convicted of killing a white female, which results in a breath-taking 
death sentencing rate of 15.02 per 100 murders, a rate that is 
statistically significant by any measure.142 
Figure 4 below graphically demonstrates the effect the combined 
race and gender of the victim has on sentencing and executions. 
Though forty-eight percent of all murders in South Carolina involve an 
African American male victim,143 only 8% of death sentences and 9% 
of executions involve African American male victim cases. To the 
contrary, only 11% of murders involve a white female victim,144 but 
42% of all death sentences and executions derive from white female 
victim cases.145 
 
 137.  See infra Appendix A. 
 138.  See Fox, supra note 136. 
 139.  See infra Appendix A and Appendix C. 
 140.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. 
 141.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. 
 142.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. 
 143.  See Fox, supra note 136.  
 144.  See Fox, supra note 136. 
 145.  See infra Appendix A; Appendix C.  
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Figure 4 
2.  Locale 
Whether a defendant receives a death sentence for a murder also 
largely depends on the location of the crime. As such, discussion of the 
“South Carolina death penalty” is a bit of a misnomer. Review of the 
available statistical information reveals there is wide variation from 
county to county and from judicial circuit to judicial circuit, in whether 
the death penalty will be sought, or obtained. Ten of South Carolina’s 
forty-six (22%) counties have never produced a death sentence.146 
Other counties, even though they are relatively large and have, at least 
comparatively speaking, significantly more murders, produce very few 
death sentences.147 By contrast, one quarter of all death sentences 
imposed in South Carolina arose from just two of the state’s forty-six 
counties. Fifty-eight of the 233 death sentences148 came from either 
 
 146.  These counties are: Allendale, Bamberg, Fairfield, Hampton, Kershaw, Laurens, Lee, 
Marion, Marlboro, and McCormick. See infra Appendix A.  
 147.  For example, Richland county (which includes the Columbia, the state capital) is the 
third largest county by population, with the tenth highest murder rate, but Richland county has 
only obtained seven death sentences and four executions.  
 148.  This number includes death sentences obtained after the reversal of an original death 
sentence.  
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Lexington or Horry County.149 Lexington County has produced thirty-
five death sentences and Horry County twenty-three.150 These counties 
also have high reversal rates; error was found in twenty-three of 
Lexington County’s thirty-five death sentences (66%),151 and in 
seventeen of Horry County’s twenty-three death sentences (74%).152 
Murder rates in these, and other counties, demonstrate that the murder 
rate (number of murders relative to the population within a county) 
does not explain the high number of death sentences in those counties. 
Lexington County has the twenty-seventh highest murder rate and 
Horry County has the tenth highest murder rate while they account for 
the first and second highest number of death sentences, respectively.153 
On the contrary, the likelihood of a county seeking and obtaining 
a death sentence depends largely on the individual solicitor in charge 
of criminal prosecutions for the Judicial Circuit in which the county 
lies.154 Four solicitors since 1976 have been responsible for obtaining 
more than one-third of all modern era death sentences in South 
Carolina.155 Walter Bailey’s term as the First Judicial Circuit Solicitor 
 
 149.  See infra Appendix A.  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. In Lexington County, thirty-five death sentences have been imposed on twenty-five 
individuals. Id. Nineteen of the twenty-five individuals had their death sentence reversed at least 
once. See id. Eleven of the individuals received sentences of life imprisonment after reversal and 
one person was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and released after reversal. Id. Six 
individuals currently remain on death row, one of whom has had his sentence overturned and is 
currently awaiting resentencing. See infra Appendix B. Despite having the highest number of 
death sentences in the state, only four individuals from Lexington County have been executed, 
two of whom were volunteers. See infra Appendix C. One individual, Larry Eugene Bell, received 
a death sentence in Lexington County but was executed for a Saluda County crime prior to the 
completion of the appellate review of the Lexington County death sentence. See id. Two cases 
were never reviewed by any court because the inmate died prior to any judicial review. See infra 
Appendix A. 
 152.  See infra Appendix A. In Horry County, twenty-three death sentences have been 
imposed on eighteen individuals. See id. Sixteen of the eighteen individuals had their death 
sentence reversed at least once. Id. Eleven of those reversals resulted in a sentence of life 
imprisonment. Id. Four individuals remain on death row, one of whom had his sentence 
overturned in post-conviction proceedings and is awaiting the outcome of the State’s appeal of 
that decision. See infra Appendix B. Only two individuals from Horry County have been 
executed, one of whom was a volunteer. See infra Appendix C. One case was never reviewed by 
any court because the inmate died prior to judicial review of his resentencing. See infra Appendix 
A.  
 153.  These rates are based on the number of solved homicides and the population within the 
counties from 1976 through 2007 (the last year for which the data are available). See Fox, supra 
note 136; UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/en.html.  
 154.  Each judicial circuit within South Carolina elects a solicitor for a term of four years. S.C. 
Code § 1-7-310. There are no term limits for solicitors in South Carolina.  
 155.  See infra Appendix A. Walter Bailey served as the First Judicial Circuit Solicitor from 
1992–2003 and obtained sixteen death sentences (80% of all death sentences obtained within the 
First Judicial Circuit). Charles Condon served as the Ninth Judicial Circuit Solicitor from 1980–
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(Calhoun, Dorchester, and Orangeburg Counties) is especially 
informative. Bailey was elected solicitor in 1992. Prior to his election, 
only two death sentences had been obtained in the circuit since 1977—
one in 1981 and one in 1984.156 Bailey served as solicitor for eleven 
years, until 2003, and obtained sixteen death sentences.157 Since 
Bailey’s retirement in 2003, only two death sentences have been 
imposed in the First Judicial Circuit—one in 2006 and one in 2008.158 
Thus, Bailey’s decisions as Circuit Solicitor account for 80% of the 
death sentences in the First Judicial Circuit. Former Ninth Judicial 
Circuit (Charleston and Berkeley Counties) Solicitor Charles Condon 
similarly accounts for 80% of the death sentences imposed in that 
circuit. Condon served as solicitor for thirteen years, from 1980 to 1993, 
and obtained sixteen death sentences.159 Prior to his term as solicitor, 
only one death sentence had been obtained, and after his tenure only 
three death sentences have been imposed in the circuit.160 
Also notable is Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Edgefield, Lexington, 
McCormick, and Saluda Counties) Solicitor Donald Myers, who has 
not only accounted for all death sentences within the judicial circuit, 
but has obtained 17% of all death sentences within the state in the 
modern era.161 Myers was elected solicitor in 1977162 and prosecuted the 
first modern era death penalty case in the state, obtaining death 
sentences against co-defendants J.D. Gleaton and Larry Gilbert on 
October 7, 1977.163 Myers was reelected every four years since that time 
(although he has announced that he will not run for reelection in 2016 
and will retire when his successor takes office in January of 2017) and 
has obtained a total of thirty-nine death sentences.164 As a result, the 
 
1993 and obtained sixteen death sentences (80% of all death sentences obtained within the Ninth 
Judicial Circuit). Donald Myers has served as the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Solicitor for the entire 
modern era of the death penalty (1977–present) obtained all thirty-nine of the death sentences 
within the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Robert Arial served as the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit 
Solicitor from 1997–2011 and obtained ten death sentences (59% of all death sentences obtained 
within the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit). Id.  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See id.  
 160.  See infra Appendix A. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Adam Beam, Emotional Life Raft for Donnie Myers, THE STATE (Nov. 26, 2006), 
http://www.thestate.com/incoming/article14405219.html. 
 163.  See infra Appendix A.  
 164.  See infra Appendix A; Beam, supra note 163; Andy Shain & Tim Flach, Veteran 
Lexington Prosecutor Myers Retiring, THE STATE, Mar. 15, 2016, 
http://www.thestate.com/news/local/article66304792.html.  
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Eleventh Judicial Circuit has produced the most death sentences of any 
of South Carolina’s sixteen Judicial Circuits, with the next highest 
circuit producing only twenty-five death sentences during the same 
time.165 
Just as murder rates cannot explain the high number of death 
sentences in various counties, neither can they explain the high number 
of death sentences by these solicitors. From 1977 to 2007, the average 
death-sentencing rate in South Carolina was 1.96 death sentences per 
100 murders.166 Solicitor Myers has the highest death-sentencing rate 
with a rate of 6.80 death sentences per 100 murders.167 Solicitors Bailey 
and Condon have similarly high death-sentencing rates of 4.79 and 
2.52, respectively, death sentences per 100 murders.168 
3.  Aggravating Circumstances and “Narrowing” 
Though Justice Breyer did not specifically address the 
constitutionally required narrowing function of statutory aggravating 
circumstances, Furman mandates that a valid capital punishment 
scheme must genuinely narrow the pool of death eligible defendants. 
Unfortunately, the South Carolina death penalty fails to do so and thus 
permits the type of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty 
condemned by the Supreme Court. 
In order to sentence an individual to death, the jury or judge 
(depending on the fact finder) must first determine that the State 
proved the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance 
 
 165.  See infra Appendix A. The Fifteenth Circuit (Horry and Georgetown Counties) has 
imposed twenty-five death sentences on twenty individuals since 1977. See id.  
 166.  These rates are based on the number of solved homicides and the death sentences 
imposed within the circuits from 1976 through 2007 (the last year for which the data are available). 
See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A.  
 167.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. This difference in sentencing rates has 
practical implications. For example, Raymond Patterson was charged with murder and armed 
robbery committed in a parking lot in Lexington County, which is in Solicitor Myers’ judicial 
circuit. Had Patterson committed the crime three or four parking spots away, he would have been 
in Richland County, within the Fifth Judicial Circuit. The sentencing rate in the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit is a mere 0.53 per 100 murders as compared to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit’s rate of 6.80 
under Solicitor Myers. See Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and 
Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 
161, 206 (2006); Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. 
 168.  See Fox, supra note 136; infra Appendix A. The fourth highest producing solicitor, 
Robert Arial of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Greenville and Pickens Counties), served as 
solicitor from 1997 to 2011 and had a slightly lower death-sentencing rate of 1.97; however, he 
served as solicitor in more recent years when the use of the death penalty declined throughout 
the state. See infra Section IV.E. During the time Arial was solicitor, the state average death-
sentencing rate was only 1.28 death sentences per 100 murders. See Fox, supra note 136; infra 
Appendix A. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.169 In the four decades since the statute was 
enacted, the number of aggravating circumstances has increased from 
seven, with one aggravating factor including a list of eight offenses that 
could make a murder death eligible if it occurred during the 
commission of the offense,170 to twelve aggravating circumstances with 
one including eleven subparts, for a total of twenty-two circumstances 
that make a murder “death eligible.”171 A 2010 study found the 
 
 169.  S.C. Code § 16-3-20(B).  
 170.  The original statute contained seven statutory aggravating factors. 1977 S.C. Acts 177. 
The first of these aggravating factors included a list of subparts making a murder death-eligible if 
it occurred during the commission of any one of eight different offenses: rape, assault with intent 
to ravish, kidnapping, burglary, robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, larceny with use of a 
deadly weapon, housebreaking, and killing by poison. The remaining six statutory aggravating 
factors were: the murder was committed by a person with a prior conviction for murder; the 
offender “knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by 
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one 
person”; the murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary 
value; the murder of a judicial officer, solicitor, or other officer of the court (current or former) 
during or because of the conduct of his or her official duties; the offender either committed or 
caused to be committed murder-for-hire; and, the murder of a peace officer, corrections officer, 
or fireman while engaged in the performance of his or her official duties. 
 171.  The legislature expanded the list of aggravating circumstances on numerous occasions:  
• In 1978, physical torture was added to the list of concomitant crimes that made a 
murder death-eligible. 1978 S.C. Acts 555 § 1.  
• In 1986, the Legislature added two more aggravating factors: “[m]urder wherein 
two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one 
scheme or course of conduct,” and murder of a child eleven years old or younger. 
1986 S.C. Acts 462 § 27.  
• In 1990, the list was again expanded to include murder during the commission of 
drug trafficking, and murder of a family member of a judicial officer, a peace 
officer, a corrections officer, or a fireman with “intent to impede or retaliate against 
the official.” 1990 S.C. Acts 604 § 15.  
• In 1995, dismemberment of a person was added as an aggravating factor. 1995 S.C. 
Acts 83 § 10.  
• In 1996, the Legislature added an entirely new aggravating factor: “[t]he murder of 
a witness or potential witness committed at any time during the criminal process 
for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime.” 1996 S.C. Acts 
317 § 1.  
• In 2002, the factor covering peace and correction officers was expanded to include 
“[t]he murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or former federal, 
state, or local law enforcement officer, peace officer or former peace officer, 
corrections officer or former corrections officer, including a county or municipal 
corrections officer or a former county or municipal corrections officer, a county or 
municipal detention facility employee or former county or municipal detention 
facility employee, or fireman or former fireman during or because of the 
performance of his official duties.” 2002 S.C. Acts 224 § 1.  
• In 2006, as part of the “Sex Offender Accountability and Protection of Minors Act 
of 2006,” the Legislature expanded the list again to make sexually violent predators 
who commit murder death penalty eligible. 2006 S.C. Acts 342 § 2. 
• In 2007, the Legislature added arson in the first degree to the list of concomitant 
crimes that make a murder death eligible. 2007 S.C. Acts 101 § 1. 
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increased number of aggravating circumstances, coupled with the 
expansive judicial interpretation of several of the aggravating factors,172 
resulted in a system where a vast majority of all murders are death 
eligible.173 Specifically, the study found that 76% of the homicides that 
occurred in Charleston County between 2002 and 2007, and 77% of the 
homicides that occurred in Richland County between 2000 and 2008 
were death eligible.174 
 
Since South Carolina began requiring proof of an aggravating 
circumstance as a prerequisite to a death sentence in 1977, 
sentencers—either juries or judges—have found an average of two 
aggravating circumstances per case.175 In eighty-three of 233 cases, a 
defendant has been sentenced to death upon the finding of a single 
aggravating factor.176 The single most prevalent aggravating factor in 
cases where the death penalty has been imposed is murder during the 
commission of armed robbery.177 The armed robbery aggravating 
factor was found in 115 cases; in 39 of those cases, armed robbery was 
the only aggravating factor found.178 Murder during the commission of 
kidnapping has been found in seventy-one cases.179 The aggravating 
circumstance of murder during the commission of armed larceny (an 
offense which does not exist under South Carolina law) was found in 
forty-seven cases.180 The next most found aggravating circumstances 
are murder during the commission of burglary (46), rape (or criminal 
sexual conduct) (46), and physical torture (38).181 Murder during the 
 
• And in 2010, the Legislature acted again, adding trafficking in persons to the list of 
concomitant crimes that make a murder death eligible. 2010 S.C. Acts 289 § 4. 
 172.  See John H. Blume, et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina’s Return to the 
Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 479, 495–98 (2010) (describing the expansive judicial interpretation of the aggravating 
factors of physical torture, kidnapping, attempted robbery, and prior conviction of murder). 
 173.  Id. at 498–500.  
 174.  Id. at 499–500. 
 175.  Appendix D to this Article reports the aggravating circumstances found in all death 
penalty trials resulting in a death sentence, including cases in which an individual was retried after 
reviewing courts reversed the original death sentence.  
 176.  See infra Appendix D. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id.  
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. Rounding out the list of aggravating circumstances found are: murder of two or more 
persons (30), murder of a law enforcement officer (21), prior murder conviction (12), risk of harm 
to more than one person in a public place (11), murder for the purpose of receiving monetary 
value (11), murder of a child under eleven (11), murder as an agent for another person (4), murder 
by poison (1), murder during commission of arson (1), murder of a judicial officer (1), and murder 
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commission of trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, and 
dismemberment, murder of a law enforcement or judicial officer’s 
family member, and murder by a sexually violent predator have never 
been found as aggravating circumstances.182 
D.  Cruel–Excessive Delays 
Justice Breyer found that “problems of reliability and unfairness 
almost inevitably lead to a third independent constitutional problem: 
excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend on 
death row, alive but under sentence of death.”183 Delays are created by 
the constitutional requirements surrounding the imposition of the 
death penalty, which require implementation of safeguards that must 
be observed when a person’s life is at stake, but “[t]hese procedural 
necessities take time to implement.”184 The constitutional problem with 
lengthy delays are twofold: (1) the delay itself “subjects death row 
inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumanizing conditions of 
confinement,” and (2) “lengthy delay undermines the death penalty’s 
penological rational.”185 
 
Lengthy delays are common in South Carolina death penalty cases. 
The men currently on death row have been there for an average of 14.5 
years.186 The two longest serving death row inmates were originally 
sentenced to death more than thirty years ago in 1983 and 1984.187 The 
average time an inmate served on death row between his original 
sentence and his execution was 11.8 years—13.1 years if the 
“volunteers” are not included in the calculation.188 Two men served 
more than twenty years on death row prior to their executions (J.D. 
Gleaton and Larry Gilbert) and twenty-one of the forty-three men 
executed served more than a dozen years between their original 
sentence and ultimate execution.189 As a result of lengthy delays, nine 
death row inmates, 5% of all those sentenced to death, died while on 
 
of a witness (1). Id. Two aggravating circumstances that are no longer part of the statute, murder 
during the commission of housebreaking and murder during the commission of assault with intent 
to ravish were found in nine and three cases, respectively. Id. 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015).  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id. at 2765.  
 186.  Calculated as of December 31, 2015. See id.  
 187.  Id.  
 188.  See Appendix C, infra.  
 189.  See id.  
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death row awaiting execution: six died of natural causes, one was killed 
by another inmate, and two committed suicide.190 
Delays in carrying out an execution inevitably result from the 
complex review process constitutionally mandated in death penalty 
cases.191 As noted above, more than 60% of all death sentences are 
overturned on appeal. In many cases, an inmate granted a new trial is 
once again sentenced to death, beginning the appellate process anew. 
In South Carolina, five individuals have been sentenced to death three 
times because their initial two trials were found to contain errors 
warranting reversal.192 Of those five men, three had their third death 
sentences overturned and received sentences of less than death,193 but 
not before each of them spent two or three decades on death row.194 
These delays, as Justice Breyer noted, undermine the penological goals 
of the death penalty—namely the deterrent and retribution 
justifications for the death penalty because an offender is more likely 
to have his sentence overturned or die of natural causes than to be 
executed after receiving a death sentence.195 
Justice Breyer also noted that the severe conditions of confinement 
make the delays especially cruel on the individual offender.196 The 
same is true in South Carolina where all death row inmates are kept in 
isolation for twenty-three hours a day. This long-term solitary 
confinement is well documented to “produce[] numerous deleterious 
harms.”197 As a result, at least in part, of solitary confinement, severe 
mental illness is widespread on South Carolina’s death row.198 A recent 
study by the Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center199 found that 
 
 190.  Id. Two were African American and seven were white. See id.  
 191.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (“[D]elay is in part a problem that the 
Constitution’s own demands create.”). 
 192.  See Appendix A, infra (showing Louis Truesdale, Edward Lee Elmore, Raymond 
Patterson, Jr., Ernest Riddle, and Freddie Owens were sentenced to death three times each).  
 193.  Edward Lee Elmore, Raymond Patterson, Jr., and Ernest Riddle. See id.  
 194.  Edward Lee Elmore served twenty-nine years on death row and was ultimately release 
after serving thirty-one years in prison despite strong evidence of his innocence. See supra note 
85 and accompanying text. Raymond Patterson, Jr. served more than seventeen years before 
being sentenced to life imprisonment upon the third reversal of his death sentence. See infra 
Appendix A. Ernest Riddle spent twenty-one years on death row before receiving a thirty-year 
sentence upon the third reversal of his death sentence. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
 195.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767–69. 
 196.  Id. at 2765. 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  Despite constitutional protections against executing juveniles or the intellectually 
disabled, and despite suffering from similar mental impairments, the severely mentally ill are still 
eligible for execution in South Carolina.  
 199.  The Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center has since been renamed Justice 360. 
The organization’s mission is to promote equality in capital cases in South Carolina. It tracks data 
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of the forty-eight death row inmates at the time of the study, thirty-four 
(70%) were severely mentally disabled.200 Mental illness—including 
schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive 
disorder, and bipolar disorder—was the most common mental 
disability, followed by brain trauma/organic brain damage and 
intellectual disability.201 Twelve inmates suffered from multiple types 
of these three conditions.202 
E.  Unusual—Decline in Use of the Death Penalty 
Finally, Justice Breyer found that the death penalty is made 
unusual by the decline in usage of the death penalty.203 Justice Breyer 
specifically found that “30 States have either formally abolished the 
death penalty or have not conducted an execution in more than eight 
years” and “9 have conducted fewer than five [executions] in that 
time,” leaving “11 States in which it is fair to say that capital 
punishment is not ‘unusual.’”204 Justice Breyer counted South Carolina 
as one of the states in which capital punishment is not unusual based 
on the fact that there had been more than five executions in the past 
eight years. However, if Justice Breyer took a closer look at South 
Carolina, he would see that the use of the death penalty within South 
Carolina has declined significantly and is becoming “unusual” in 
practice. 
The number and rate of death sentences in South Carolina has 
decreased dramatically in recent years. Death sentences per year in the 
1970s were low as the state’s prosecutors began working with the new 
death penalty statute.205 By 1981, the new machinery of death was up 
and running at full speed and the state had ten death sentences that 
year.206 From 1981 through 1996, the state averaged nine death 
sentences each year, with a high in 1986 of fifteen death sentences.207 
The number of death sentences per year declined between 1997 and 
 
related to all facets of the South Carolina death penalty and has done so since the 1980s.  
 200.  The Death Penalty Resource & Defense Center, Mental Disability and the Death 
Penalty: Why South Carolina Should Ban the Execution of the Severely Mentally Disabled (Aug. 
2014), on file with the authors.  
 201.  Id. at 6. 
 202.  Id.  
 203.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773 (2015).  
 204.  Id.  
 205.  See infra Appendix A. From 1977 to 1980, the state had between one and seven death 
sentences per year. Id.  
 206.  Id.  
 207.  Id. 
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2007, averaging only six death sentences per year with a high of eight 
death sentences in 1998 and 2001.208 Since 2008, however, the decrease 
has been even more dramatic with an average of fewer than two death 
sentences per year.209 Indeed, the state went four of the last five years 
(2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015) without a single death sentence 
imposed.210 
Figure 5 
The decrease in death sentences cannot be explained by a 
decreasing number of murders during the same time period—though 
the number of murders per year has decreased slightly since the 
1990s.211 As the graph below demonstrates, the number of death 
 
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Id. Notably, during the three consecutive years with no death sentences, thirty-one cases 
where the State originally sought the death penalty were resolved with sentences of less than 
death. See infra Appendix H.  
 211.  South Carolina’s murder rate in 2013 was 6.2 murders for every 100,000 people. 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-
u.s.2013/tables/4tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_4_crime_in_the_united_states_by_region_geogr
aphic_division_and_state_2012-2013.xls. This number includes non-negligent manslaughter. Id. 
This placed South Carolina as the state with the sixth highest murder rate nationally; the national 
average was 4.5 per 100,000. Id. Like most states, the South Carolina murder rate has decreased 
since the mid-1990s, though the decrease in the murder rate has been less consistent in South 
5
1
6
7
10
5
13
9
10
15
12
6 6
3
10
3
8
9
1111
5
8
5 5
8
5 5
6
4
5 5
4 4
2
0 0 0
2
0
0
4
8
12
16
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Death Sentences by Year
VANN BLUME (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016 10:00 AM 
2016] THE DEATH PENALTY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 215 
sentences per murder has decreased significantly from its peak in 1986, 
when the state saw 4.5 death sentences per 100 murders.212 Since 2008, 
South Carolina has only imposed .45 death sentences per 100 
murders.213 
Figure 6 
South Carolina’s death sentencing rate has historically been about 
average compared to other death penalty jurisdictions. About 1.6 
death sentences have been imposed per 100 murders in South Carolina 
since 1977.214 The average for all death penalty jurisdictions is 1.5 per 
100 murders.215 However, there have been only two death sentences in 
 
Carolina than the national trend. In 1996, South Carolina’s murder rate was 9 per 100,000. The 
lowest murder rate in South Carolina since 1996 was in 2010 when the murder rate was 5.4 per 
100,000. See id. 
 212.  Death sentencing rates were calculated by comparing the number of death sentences 
from infra Appendix A and the number of murders in South Carolina and other death penalty 
jurisdictions as reported in the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Annual Crime Reports. 
DISASTERCENTER.COM, United States Crime Rates 1960-2013, 
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm [hereinafter FBI Crime Report]. 
 213.  See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A. 
 214.  See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A. 
 215.  See FBI Crime Report, supra note 212; Appendix A. 
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the last five years. Murder statistics are not available for the most 
recent years, but with such a low number of death sentences, South 
Carolina’s recent death sentencing rate is surely lower than the average 
in other death penalty jurisdictions. 
Figure 7216 
 
 216.  See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 By State By Year, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008; 
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The recent decrease in death sentences can be attributed, at least 
in part, to the creation of the Capital Trial Division of the South 
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense. The Capital Trial Division 
was created in 2008 with a staff of two lawyers and two mitigation 
specialists and today is staffed by three attorneys and one 
investigator.217 The mission of the office is to provide representation to 
capital defendants at less cost to the State than through the 
appointment of private attorneys and to provide consultation and 
training for other lawyers representing South Carolina defendants 
facing the death penalty.218 In practice, an attorney from the Capital 
Trial Division has been involved, either by formal appointment or 
informally prior to the issuance of a death notice, in many—43% since 
2008—of the potential capital cases along with either a local public 
defender or a private attorney. 
Since 2008, the Capital Trial Division has worked on thirty 
potential capital cases in which the defendant has since been 
sentenced.219 Of those thirty cases, only three resulted in death 
sentences, one of which was overturned on direct appeal and the 
defendant subsequently accepted a plea to life without parole.220 More 
than three-quarters of the cases handled by the Capital Trial Division 
(77%) have been resolved prior to trial either through a plea 
agreement to a sentence of life or less, withdrawal of the death penalty 
as a sentencing option prior to trial, or the solicitor’s decision not to 
seek the death penalty in a death eligible case.221 Overall, since 2008, 
cases in which the State was likely to seek the death penalty have been 
resolved prior to trial without a death sentence 80% of the time.222 The 
Capital Trial Division credits its early defense involvement in potential 
death penalty cases with the ability to resolve so many cases pretrial. 
In many instances, the Division or other lawyers trained by the 
Division become involved in homicide cases well before the State 
officially indicates its intention to seek the death penalty, allowing the 
lawyers to conduct factual and mitigation investigation early on for use 
in negotiations with the solicitors. This often allows solicitors to decide 
 
FBI Crime Report, supra note 212.  
 217.  See SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, CAPITAL TRIAL 
DIVISION, https://www.sccid.sc.gov/about-us/capital-defenders.  
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Appendix H to this Article lists all of the pretrial death penalty case outcomes since the 
Capital Trial Division began tracking death penalty cases in 2008.  
 220.  See infra Appendix H.  
 221.  See id.  
 222.  See id.  
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a case is not “death-worthy” before ever making a public commitment 
to seek death, making it easier to decide not to seek the penalty. Even 
when solicitors formally announce that they intend to seek death, early 
involvement by defense counsel provides both sides with more 
information to use in plea negotiations, the majority of the time 
resulting in a plea to less than death.223 
The number of executions per year has also decreased in recent 
years. Similar to the national trend, South Carolina carried out the 
highest number of executions in the mid to late 1990s.224 The highest 
number of executions per year occurred in 1996, with six executions, 
and 1998, with seven executions. Since the late 1990s, the execution 
rate in South Carolina has declined.225 Since 2010, South Carolina has 
carried out only one execution and that individual waived his pending 
appeals in order to be executed in 2011.226 This trend can be explained, 
in significant part, by the reduced number of death sentences over the 
last fifteen years, the number of reversals resulting from prejudicial 
error, and the Supreme Court’s creation of categorical bars to 
execution for juveniles and persons with intellectual disability.227 
 
 223.  Capital trial units in other states have produced similar results. See, e.g., Larry O’Dell, 
Study: Better Legal Defense Leads to Fewer Death Penalties, AP, Oct. 19, 2015, available at 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/e44f4c549b6b4b5297191386abc0c399/study-better-legal-defense-
leads-fewer-death-penalties (Virginia); Greg Land, ‘Life Without Parole’ Leads to Shrinking 
Death Penalty Pipeline, DAILY REPORT, Dec. 16, 2015, 
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202744912371/Life-Without-Parole-Leads-to-Shrinking-
Death-Penalty-Pipeline?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (Georgia). 
 224.  See infra Appendix C; DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, EXECUTIONS BY 
YEAR SINCE 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year. 
 225.  See infra Appendix C.  
 226.  Id.  
 227.  See supra notes 120–21, and accompanying text. 
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Figure 8 
The death penalty in South Carolina, like the rest of the country, 
has become increasingly concentrated geographically.228 Only fourteen 
of South Carolina’s forty-six counties have sentenced a defendant to 
death in the last decade.229 Only four counties (Lexington, Horry, 
Spartanburg, and Greenville) have imposed more than one death 
sentence in the last ten years.230 Indeed, ten South Carolina counties 
have not imposed a death sentence since 1976.231 Thus, for most of 
South Carolina, use of the death penalty has become unusual. 
  
 
 228.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2774 (2015) (noting that “66 of America’s 3,143 
counties accounted for approximately 50% of all death sentences imposed”).  
 229.  See infra Appendix A. 
 230.  See id.  
 231.  See id.  
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County Sentences 
2006-2015 
Lexington 5 
Horry 3 
Spartanburg 2 
Greenville 2 
Charleston 1 
Anderson 1 
Dorchester 1 
Greenwood 1 
Calhoun 1 
Sumter 1 
Clarendon 1 
Georgetown 1 
Pickens 1 
Edgefield 1 
 
V.  OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE DATA 
Despite forty years of legislative and judicial regulation, by all of 
Justice Breyer’s measures of constitutional validity—unreliability, 
arbitrariness, delay and infrequency—the South Carolina death 
penalty is an abysmal failure. The “safeguards” put in place at trial for 
the purpose of improving the quality of representation (e.g., 
appointment of two qualified attorneys, special funding procedures, 
etc.),232 and a number of decisions attempting to regulate the conduct 
of prosecutors and make jury decision-making more reliable have not 
reduced the amount of error in the system; appellate courts overturn 
 
 232.  See S.C. Code § 16-3-26.  
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death sentences in approximately two out of three cases. Even after an 
initial reversal, death penalty cases remain error-prone, resulting in 
(sometimes) three or four death penalty trials of the same person. Most 
people sentenced to death eventually end up with life sentences (or 
less); however, even when a death sentenced inmate runs the entire 
appellate gauntlet, there is no guarantee the case is error-free, the 
system worked properly or even that we are executing the person who 
committed the crime.233 Race, gender, and geography—more than the 
heinousness of the offense—determine who is sentenced to death, and 
innocent defendants have spent years on death row before obtaining 
their freedom. The South Carolina death penalty—in sum—is still 
arbitrary after all these years. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court allowed states to resume 
the use of the death penalty on the assumption that it would be 
imposed only in appropriate cases (i.e., not on your “average 
murderers”) in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner. As we 
believe we have demonstrated in this article that is by no means the 
case. It is clear, after decades of trying in vain, that the South Carolina 
death penalty system is (literally) fatally flawed. And, given both the 
pre-Furman and post-Gregg capital punishment experience, it is 
equally clear that there is no fix or cure for its ailments. Now is the time 
for the United States Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme 
Court or the General Assembly to bring the experiment with capital 
punishment to an end. 
If, instead (as is more likely), the South Carolina death penalty 
continues to limp along before meeting its inevitable demise, the 
appropriate stakeholders should at a minimum attempt to “fix” the 
major systemic flaws: (1) the failure to meaningfully narrow the pool 
of individuals eligible for the death penalty; (2) the failure to eliminate 
significant race and gender effects in the imposition of the penalty; and 
(3) the lack of meaningful appellate proportionality review. First, as 
discussed above, virtually all murders are “death eligible;” i.e., a 
prosecutor could seek the death penalty—should she choose to do so—
in more than 75% of murder cases given both the expansion of the 
 
 233.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Catoe, 345 S.C. 389, 548 S.E.2d 587 (2001) (denying a motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence). Johnson was executed in 2002 
despite calls for clemency, including from members of the victim’s family, based on evidence of 
his innocence. See Application for Executive Clemency Submitted on Behalf of Richard Charles 
Johnson, http://deathpenaltyusa.org/usa/images/clemency/johnson_richardcharles.pdf; Rick 
Brundrett & Cliff Leblanc, Lethal Injection Ends Life of Convicted Killer, THE STATE (May 4, 
2002).  
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number of aggravating circumstances and the broad interpretation of 
several commonly utilized aggravating circumstances (e.g., murder in 
the commission of kidnapping and murder during the commission of 
physical torture). Aggravating circumstances—in theory—play a 
“constitutionally necessary function” in defining capital murder in a 
way that both “genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty” and “reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more 
severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of 
murder.”234 In South Carolina they clearly do not. Capital punishment 
is not reserved for the “worst of the worst” but all too often is imposed 
on the “average murderer.” 
One possible solution that would at least reduce arbitrariness 
would be to reduce the number of aggravating circumstances to 
capture only the worst crimes.235 For example, the legislature could 
limit the application of the death penalty to persons with prior murder 
convictions who kill a prison guard or to serial killers.236 Doing so 
would limit opportunities for race and gender bias and prosecutorial 
excess to infect the determination of who should live or die as Furman 
and Gregg originally intended.237 In addition to restricting the number 
of death eligible offenses, the number of death eligible offenders 
should also be limited. The category of offenders most in need of a new 
exclusion from capital punishment given existing Eighth Amendment 
precedent and their intuitive lack of “death-worthiness” are persons 
with severe mental illness.238 Such a limitation is a natural extension of 
the bans on executing juveniles and the intellectually disabled.239 The 
 
 234.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 235.  See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1995) (proposing to limit the number of aggravating circumstances to 
“ensure that the worst members of our society . . . are put to death” as a way to remove some of 
the objections to capital punishment, such as racial biases effecting sentencing decisions).  
 236.  As currently practiced, remember that the high number of persons sentenced to death 
and executed for “garden variety” crimes such as murder during the commission of armed 
robbery. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. We do not mean to minimize the 
significance of this type of homicide, or any homicide for that matter, but it is hardly subject to 
debate that this is not one of the more culpable categories of murder. 
 237.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) (holding that aggravating factors 
“provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce the likelihood that it will 
impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary”). 
 238.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Resolution 122A (Aug. 2006) (recommending that 
“defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of their offense, they had 
a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate 
the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in 
relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law”), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/122AReport.pdf. 
 239.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People With Mental Illness, 
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juvenile and intellectual disability categorical bars were grounded in 
the Court’s determination that their group characteristics rendered 
them less culpable than the average murderer and because, sometimes, 
their youth or intellectual disability would actually be held against 
them at a capital sentencing proceeding.240 The same is true for the 
severely mentally ill—those individuals have similar or even greater 
reduced culpability and their illness has been empirically proven to be 
viewed by jurors as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor.241 
In early 2015, a bill was proposed in the South Carolina legislature 
that would prohibit the execution of a person who had a severe mental 
disability at the time of the commission of the crime.242 The bill defines 
severe mental disability as “a severe mental illness that significantly 
impairs a person’s capacity to do any of the following: (i) appreciate 
the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the person’s conduct; (ii) 
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (iii) conform the 
person’s conduct to the requirements of the law. . .” or as “dementia or 
traumatic brain injury that results in significantly sub-average 
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant 
limitations in adaptive functioning.”243 Adopting a ban on executing 
the severely mentally ill would be another step towards ensuring the 
worst (most culpable) offenders receive the death penalty, as opposed 
to a random selection of the most vulnerable offenders. 
Another necessary next step is to attempt to minimize the 
significant race effects driving death sentencing in South Carolina. The 
General Assembly could accomplish this by amending the state post-
conviction relief statute244 to allow courts to consider whether race was 
a significant factor in the decision to seek death against the defendant. 
 
33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 293 (2003).  
 240.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 
(2002). 
 241.  South Carolina law defines the presence of a mental disability as mitigating evidence; 
S.C. Code § 16-3-20(b)(7) (listing “[t]he age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime” 
as a statutory mitigating circumstance), however, empirical studies have conclusively 
demonstrated that juries tend to view mental illness and disability as aggravating factors rather 
than reasons to spare the defendant from death. See e.g., Kevin M. Doyle, Lethal Crapshoot: The 
Fatal Unreliability of the Penalty Phase, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 275 (2008); Steven 
Garvey, Aggravation And Mitigation In Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1538 (1998); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The 
Improper Consideration Of Mitigating Factors In Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 
409 (1990); Ellen Fells Berkman, Mental Illness As An Aggravating Circumstance In Capital 
Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291 (1989). 
 242.  H. 3535, 121 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015). 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  S.C. Code § 17-27-160.  
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Existing law allows a court to order a new trial or sentencing hearing 
when there has been racial bias in jury selection,245 or racially charged 
arguments made to the jury,246 but makes it virtually impossible for a 
defendant to prove that the decision to seek death was based on race 
by using statistics to prove racial bias in a solicitor’s decision on the 
death penalty.247 A Racial Justice Act enacted in North Carolina in 
2009 outlined specific evidence and procedures a defendant could use 
to prove his death sentence was the result of racial bias.248 If a 
defendant is able to meet his burden of proof, then the death sentence 
is vacated and a life sentence imposed.249 South Carolina should adopt 
a similar provision to ensure that race is not a determining factor in 
who receives the death penalty. 
Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court could remove some of 
the arbitrariness from the current death penalty regime by taking 
seriously its statutorily required proportionality review. Under current 
practice, the court, in considering whether a death sentence is 
 
 245.  See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). This, of course, is all in theory. In reality, 
solicitors use their peremptory challenges in capital cases overwhelmingly against jurors of color 
and thus a not-insignificant number of African American South Carolina death row inmates were 
sentenced to death by all-white juries. See Ann Eisenberg, The Conscience of the Community: 
Pre-Trial Removal of Women and African-American Jurors in South Carolina Capital Punishment 
Cases, 1998-2012 (unpublished manuscript), on file with authors. Through their work on South 
Carolina death penalty cases, the authors have identified at least three African Americans 
currently on death row as a result of a sentence imposed by an all-white jury: Johnny Bennett, 
Richard Moore, and Kevin Mercer.  
 246.  See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Again, this protection is largely 
theoretical; in fact, solicitors use explicit or implicit appeals to race in many cases and the courts 
turn a blind eye to it. The authors currently represent an individual on South Carolina’s death 
row whose capital trial (before an all-white jury) included remarks by the Solicitor referring to 
the large African American defendant as “King Kong,” a “caveman,” a “big old bear,” and a 
“beast of burden.” The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to reverse the defendant’s death 
sentence based on these comments, even though counsel uncovered evidence that one of the 
jurors was racially biased and referred to the defendant as a “Nigger.” See State v. Bennett, 369 
S.C. 219, 231−33, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288−89 (2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bennett v. State, 
No. 2009-145366 (Oct. 7, 2010); Order Denying Certiorari, Bennett v. State, No. 2009-145366 
(Nov. 7, 2013). 
 247.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In fact, only one South Carolina case has 
been successful in proving racial bias in the decision to see the death penalty and that was only 
because the assistant solicitor admitted that the decision to seek death in a black victim case was 
made in order because “I felt like the black community would be upset if we did not seek the 
death penalty because there were two black victims in this case.” Kelly v. State, No. 99-CP-42-
1174 (Oct. 6, 2003) (Trial Court Order Granting Post-Conviction Relief).  
 248.  N.C. S.L. 2009-464. 
 249.  See id. The North Carolina Racial Justice Act was repealed in 2013 out of a “fear of too 
much justice,” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 399 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting), after three 
African-American death row inmates established race played a role in their capital trials. See N.C. 
S.L. 2013-154; Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death 
Penalty Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2013), at A13.  
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disproportionate, reviews “similar cases” which it defines as other 
cases “with an actual conviction and sentence of death rendered by a 
trier of fact.”250 But defining “similar cases” as those in which a death 
sentence was imposed is tautological; the court is always able to find a 
case with similar aggravating circumstances and thus the death 
sentence is always proportionate to the crime, regardless of how many 
similar cases resulted in life sentences.251 The court has recognized as 
much noting that reviewing only other cases in which a death sentence 
was obtained “is largely a self-fulfilling prophesy as simply examining 
similar cases where the defendant was sentenced to death will almost 
always lead to the conclusion that the death sentence under review is 
proportional.”252 But, to date, it has taken no action to engage in a more 
robust and meaningful review of whether death sentences are in fact 
proportionate to the offense and offender. It would be easy to do so; 
the South Carolina Office of Court Administration, the Circuit 
Solicitors and Circuit Public Defenders and the Department of 
Corrections have—collectively—the data needed to create the pool of 
relevant death and life cases. The only thing lacking is the commitment 
to monitor the system for disproportionate death sentences. 
  
 
 250.  State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 591, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74 (1982).  
 251.  The court generally uses standard language in its opinion to find a death sentence is not 
disproportionate:  
[Appellant’s] convictions and sentences are affirmed. The death sentence was not the result of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and the jury’s finding of aggravating 
circumstances is supported by the evidence. Further, the death penalty is not excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar capital cases.  
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (2004). The court then goes on to list other 
death penalty cases in which the same aggravating circumstances were found as support for the 
conclusion that the death sentence was not disproportionate. 
 252.  State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 125 n.8 716 S.E.2d 895, 908 n.8 (2011). Because the 
issue was not raised on appeal in Dickerson, the court declined to overrule Copeland. Despite 
noting its concern with reviewing only cases resulting in a death sentence in its proportionality 
review, the Court has continued to do so since Dickerson and, arguably proving the “self-fulfilling 
prophecy,” has never found a death sentence disproportionate. See, e.g., State v. Inman, 395 S.C. 
539, 567–68, 720 S.E.2d 31, 46 (2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
We end where we began. The arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty led a majority of the Supreme Court in Furman to conclude 
that the death penalty was a cruel and unusual punishment that 
violated the Eighth Amendment. In Gregg, the Court allowed capital 
punishment to resume based on its confidence that post-Furman 
improvements to state death penalty systems had eliminated that 
arbitrariness. That confidence, however, was misplaced. The death 
penalty in South Carolina is still arbitrary after all these years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher’s Note: A separate PDF of the appendices below is available 
for download from the Duke Law Scholarship Repository, accessible 
through: djclpp.law.duke.edu. 
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APPENDIX A* 
South Carolina Death Sentences - List of Those Sentenced to Death 
1977-2015 
 
 
Name 
 
Defendan
t Race 
 
Victim 
Race 
 
County of 
Conviction 
 
Circuit of 
Conviction 
Original 
Sentence 
Date 
Sentence 
Date After 
Reversal 
 
 
Final Result 
1 Gleaton, J.D. B/M W/M Lexington 11 10/7/1977 2/26/1980 Executed 
2 Gilbert, Larry B/M W/M Lexington 11 10/7/1977 2/26/1980 Executed 
3 Gill, Eric Andre B/M W/M York 16 1977  Life Imprisonment 
4 Shaw, Joseph Carl W/M W/F 
W/M 
Richland 5 12/16/1977  Executed 
5 Roach, James Terry W/M W/F 
W/M 
Richland 5 12/16/1977  Executed 
6 Tyner, Rudolph B/M W/F 
W/M 
Horry 15 8/11/1978 10/11/1980 Died on Death Row 
7 Plath, John W/M B/F Beaufort 14 2/9/1979 5/14/1982 Executed 
8 Arnold, John W/M B/F Beaufort 14 2/9/1979 5/14/1982 Executed 
9 Goolsby, Sidney Ross W/M W/F Greenwood 8 1979  Life Imprisonment 
10 Woomer, Ronald W/M W/F Horry 15 7/20/1979 7/23/1981 Executed (Horry County) 
W/M Colleton 14 6/7/1981 
11 Linder, Michael W/M B/M Colleton 14 1979  Acquitted 
12 Hyman, William Gibbs W/M W/M Charleston 9 10/12/1979  Life Imprisonment 
13 Adams, Sylvester B/M B/M York 16 3/3/1980 1/30/1982 Executed 
14 Thompson, Albert "Bo" B/M W/M Greenville 13 9/27/1980  Life Imprisonment 
15 Truesdale, Louis B/M W/F Lancaster 6 12/11/1980 5/17/19831 
9/25/1987 
Executed 
16 Roberts, Sammy David W/M 2 W/M 
B/M 
Berkeley 9 1/19/1981  Executed 
17 Copeland, Henry Wesley W/M 2 W/M 
B/M 
Berkeley 9 1/19/1981  Died on Death Row 
18 Butler, Horace B/M W/F Charleston 9 1/26/1981  Life Imprisonment 
19 Smart, Ronald Francis W/M W/M Lexington 11 3/11/1981  Life Imprisonment 
20 Yates, Dale Roberts W/M W/F Greenville 13 5/2/1981  Life Imprisonment 
21 Butler, James Anthony W/M Asian/M Orangeburg 1 3/21/1981  Life Imprisonment 
22 Patterson, Wardell B/M W/M York 16 10/29/1980 6/20/1983 Life Imprisonment 
23 Koon, Paul Finley W/M W/F Aiken 2 6/12/1981 2/18/1983 Life Imprisonment 
24 Sloan, Michael A. W/M W/F Lexington 11 10/2/1981  Life Imprisonment 
25 Elmore, Edward Lee B/M W/F Greenwood 8 4/19/1982 4/2/1984 
2/28/19872 
Released 
26 Spann, Sterling Barnett B/M W/F York 16 4/26/1982  Life Imprisonment 
27 Woods, Stanley Eugene B/M W/M Greenville 13 1983  Life Imprisonment 
28 Stewart, Richard B/M W/F Anderson 10 3/14/19833 1/25/19853 Life Imprisonment 
29 Gaskins, Donald Henry W/M B/M Richland 5 3/26/1983  Executed 
30 Chaffee, Jonathan W/M W/F Florence 12 4/2/19834  Life Imprisonment 
31 Ferrell, Dallas Clarence W/M W/F Florence 12 4/2/19834  Life Imprisonment 
32 Norris, John Foster B/M B/F Anderson 10 6/10/1983  Life Imprisonment 
33 Damon, Shellie B/M B/F 
B/
Orangeburg 1 1/16/1984  Life Imprisonment 
34 Skipper, Ronald DeRay W/M W/F Horry 15 6/28/1983  Life Imprisonment 
35 Lucas, Cecil Doyle W/M W/F 
W/M 
York 16 7/27/1983  Executed 
36 Singleton, Fred B/M W/F Newberry 8 9/17/19835  Found Incompetent 
37 South, Robert W/M W/M Lexington 11 11/17/1983  Executed 
38 Smith, Andrew Lavern B/M B/F 
B/
Anderson 10 1/17/1984 10/31/1987 Executed 
39 Jones, Donald Allen B/M W/F Lancaster 6 2/7/1984 5/1/1987 Pending 
40 Plemmons, Jerry W/M W/F Union 16 2/26/1984 5/8/1987 Life Imprisonment 
41 Peterson, Mose, III B/M W/M Florence 12 8/6/1984  Life Imprisonment 
42 Stubbs, Craig Anthony B/M W/M Florence 12 8/6/1984  Life Imprisonment 
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1977-2015 
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Conviction 
 
Circuit of 
Conviction 
Original 
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Sentence 
Date After 
Reversal 
 
 
Final Result 
43 Drayton, Leroy B/M W/F Charleston 9 10/8/1984 4/12/1986 Executed 
44 Pierce, Marcellus, Jr. B/M W/F Richland 5 12/7/1984  Life Imprisonment 
45 Brown, Jessie Keith W/M W/M Spartanburg 7 1/28/1985 3/24/1987 Acquitted of Murder 
46 Middleton, Frank B/M W/
F 
Charleston 9 2/4/1985 11/24/1986 Executed (for black victim 
only) 
47 Patrick, Gary Lee W/M W/M Oconee 10 4/15/1985  Life Imprisonment 
48 Matthews, Earl B/M W/F Charleston 9 5/13/1985 4/24/1987 Executed 
49 Arthur, Limmie B/M B/M Horry 15 8/8/1985 5/13/1987 Life Imprisonment 
50 Patterson, Raymond, Jr. B/M W/M Lexington 11 9/7/1985 11/7/1987 
2/14/1995 
Life Imprisonment 
51 Cooper, Kamathene B/M W/M Florence 12 10/4/1985  Life Imprisonment 
52 Kornahrens, Fred W/M W/F 
2W/M 
Charleston 9 11/19/1985  Executed 
53 Riddle, Ernest W/M W/F Cherokee 7 2/1/1986 10/1/1987 
11/15/19912 
30 Year Sentence 
54 Hawkins, Calvil B/M W/M Darlington 4 11/17/1985  Life Imprisonment 
55 Johnson, Richard W/M B/M Jasper 14 2/15/1986 3/13/1988 Executed 
56 Howard, Ronnie B/M Asian/F Greenville 13 6/15/1986  Executed 
57 Weldon, Dana B/M Asian/F Greenville 13 6/15/1986  Life Imprisonment 
58 Bell, Larry Gene W/M W/F Saluda 11 2/27/19866  Executed (Saluda County) 
W/F Lexington 11 4/2/19877 
59 Bellamy, Lee Grant B/M B/M Horry 15 6/28/1986  Life Imprisonment 
60 Atkins, Joseph NA/M B/F 
W/M 
Charleston 9 6/28/1986 6/25/1988 Executed 
61 Reed, Jerry Lee B/M W/M Abbeville 8 7/22/1986  Life Imprisonment 
62 Diddlemeyer, Gerald W/M B/M Horry 15 9/13/1986  Life Imprisonment 
63 West, Floyd W/M W/M Lexington 11 10/21/1986  Died on Death Row 
64 Cockerham, Harold W/M W/F Horry 15 10/11/1986  Life Imprisonment 
65 Owens, Alvin W/M W/M Horry 15 5/19/1986  Life Imprisonment 
66 Cain, James Russell W/M 2W/M Chesterfield 4 11/25/1986  Life Imprisonment 
67 Gathers, Demetrius B/M B/M Charleston 9 3/21/1987  Life Imprisonment 
68 Caldwell, RickieTim W/M W/M York 16 5/23/1988  Life Imprisonment 
69 Torrence, Michael W/M W/M Lexington 11 5/28/1988 9/26/1992 Executed 
70 Victor, William Keith W/M W/M Edgefield 11 10/1/1988  Life Imprisonment 
71 Green, Anthony B/M W/F Charleston 9 10/1/1988  Executed 
72 Bell, William Henry, Jr. B/M W/M Anderson 10 3/14/1989  Pending 
73 Manning, Warren D. B/M W/M Dillon 4 4/15/19898 4/3/19959 Acquitted 
74 Wilson, James William W/M 2B/F Greenwood 8 5/9/1989  Pending 
75 Sims, Mitchell W/M 2W/M Berkeley 9 5/13/198910  Pending 
76 Young, Kevin Dean B/M W/M Anderson 10 5/22/1989 6/12/1993 Executed 
77 Orr, Ronald John W/M W/F 
W/M 
Chester 6 11/14/1989  Life Imprisonment 
78 Davis, Wilbert Ray B/M W/M Florence 12 3/23/1990  Life Imprisonment 
79 Davis, Tommy Lee B/M W/F Greenwood 8 5/14/199011  Life Imprisonment 
80 Smith, Rebecca W/F W/M Horry 15 12/10/1990  Life Imprisonment 
81 Simmons, Jonathan Dale B/M W/F Richland 5 6/30/1991  Life Imprisonment 
82 Cooper, Gene Tony W/M W/F Lexington 11 2/22/1991  Life Imprisonment 
83 Elkins, Michael W/M W/F Jasper 14 3/30/1991  Executed 
84 Charping, Michael W/M W/F Lexington 11 4/29/1991 9/23/1996 Life Imprisonment 
85 Ray, Johnny, Jr. W/M W/F Spartanburg 7 5/1/1991 1/20/1994 Life Imprisonment 
86 Von Dohlen, Herman W/M W/M Berkeley 9 5/28/1991  Life Imprisonment 
87 Rocheville, David W/M W/M Spartanburg 7 7/15/1991  Executed 
88 Longworth, Richard W/M W/M Spartanburg 7 9/10/199112  Executed 
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   W/M Spartanburg 7 9/10/199112   
89 Hall, Larry Eugene W/M 2 W/F Pickens 13 1/28/19929  Life Imprisonment 
90 Southerland, Robert W/M W/F Lexington 11 3/9/1992  Life Imprisonment 
91 Franklin, Ellis B/M W/F Williamsburg 3 1/22/1993  Life Imprisonment 
92 Holmes, Bobby Lee B/M B/F York 16 4/20/1993 3/28/2001 Life Imprisonment 
93 Nance, Robert Lee B/M W/F Florence 12 6/25/1993  Life Imprisonment 
94 Hudgins, Joseph W/M (16) W/M Anderson 10 7/27/1993  Life Imprisonment 
95 Tucker, Richard B/M W/F Spartanburg 7 10/28/1993  Life Imprisonment 
96 Williams, Luke, III W/M W/F 
W/M 
Edgefield 11 11/23/1993  Executed 
97 Tucker, James N. W/M W/F Calhoun 1 12/8/1993 7/17/1996 Executed (Sumter County) 
W/F Sumter 3 12/16/1994 
98 George, Ricky B/M W/M Horry 15 1/20/1994  Life Imprisonment 
99 McWee, Jerry W/M W/M Aiken 2 1/23/1994  Executed 
100 Conyers, Robert B/M (16) W/F Clarendon 3 2/17/1994  Life Imprisonment 
101 Whipple, James W/M W/F Horry 15 2/18/1994  Life Imprisonment 
102 Rogers, Timothy D. B/M W/F Dorchester 1 3/5/1994 12/1/1996 50 Year Sentence 
103 Humphries, Shawn W/M W/M Greenville 13 8/9/1994  Executed 
104 Simpson, Keith L. B/M W/M Spartanburg 7 9/20/1994  Life Imprisonment 
105 Ivey, Thomas B/M W/M Orangeburg 1 1/20/1995  Executed 
W/M Orangeburg 1 7/17/1995 
106 Byram, Jason W/M W/F Richland 5 3/9/1995  Executed 
107 Kelly, Theodore B/M B/
M 
Spartanburg 7 8/14/1995  Life Imprisonment 
108 Hughes, Herman B/M (17) W/M Calhoun 1 9/12/1995  Life Imprisonment 
109 Hughes, Mar-Reece B/M W/M York 16 9/22/199513  Pending 
110 Bennett, Johnny B/M B/M Lexington 11 10/19/1995 7/16/2000 Pending 
111 Hill, David Clayton W/M W/M Georgetown 15 10/31/1995  Executed 
112 Gardner, Joseph B/M W/F Dorchester 1 12/13/1995  Executed 
113 Powers, Ted W/M (17) W/F Lexington 11 2/23/1996  Life Imprisonment 
114 Johnson, Roger Dale W/M W/F Calhoun 1 2/27/1996  Died on Death Row 
115 Rosemond, Andre B/M W/F Spartanburg 7 3/30/1996  Life Imprisonment 
116 Ard, Joseph W/M W/F 
& 
Lexington 11 4/25/1996  Released 
117 Hicks, William B/M W/M Aiken 2 4/30/1996  30 Year Sentence 
118 Reed, James Earl B/M B/F 
B/
Charleston 9 6/9/1996  Executed 
119 Huggins, Titus B/M W/M Horry 15 9/12/1996  Life Imprisonment 
120 Council, Donnie B/M W/F Aiken 2 10/23/1996  Pending Resentencing 
121 Stone, Bobby Wayne W/M W/M Sumter 3 1/28/1997 2/27/2005 Pending 
122 Williams, George Allen B/M B/F Lexington 11 2/7/1997  Died on Death Row 
123 Starnes, Norman W/M W/M Lexington 11 4/25/1997 11/17/2007 Pending 
124 Terry, Gary W/M B/F Lexington 11 9/21/1997  Pending 
125 Hughey, John B/M B/F Abbeville 8 10/30/1997  Pending 
126 Shafer, Wesley W/M W/M Union 16 1/21/1998  Life Imprisonment 
127 Quattlebaum, Robert Joseph W/M W/M Lexington 11 3/4/1998  Life Imprisonment 
128 McClure, David, Jr. W/M W/M Barnwell 2 4/29/1998  Life Imprisonment 
129 Aleksey, Bayan B/M B/M Orangeburg 1 9/1/1998  Pending 
130 Kelly, William W/M (17) W/M Lexington 11 9/19/1998  Life Imprisonment 
131 Locklair, Jimmy W/M W/F Spartanburg 7 9/22/1998  Life Imprisonment 
132 Jones, Jeffrey L B/M W/F 
W/M 
Lexington 11 11/10/1998 3/14/2007 Life Imprisonment 
133 Shuler, Calvin B/M W/M Dorchester 1 11/12/1998  Executed 
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134 Owens, Freddie B/M B/F Greenville 13 2/17/1999 2/14/2003 
11/11/2006 
Pending 
135 Simmons, Kenneth B/M B/F Dorchester 1 3/2/1999  Pending 
136 Robertson, James W/M W/F 
W/M 
York 16 3/26/1999  Pending 
137 Weik, John Edward W/M W/F Dorchester 1 5/29/1999  Pending 
138 Stokes, Samuel Louis B/M W/F Orangeburg 1 10/31/1999  Pending 
139 Hill, David Mark W/M W/M 
W/F 
B/F 
Aiken 2 2/14/2000  Executed 
140 Burkhart, Troy Alan W/M 2W/M 
1W/F 
Anderson 10 3/18/2000 3/31/2004 Life Imprisonment 
141 Tench, Christopher Dale W/M W/M Anderson 10 5/8/2000  Died on Death Row 
142 Passaro, Michael W/M W/F Horry 15 8/17/2000  Executed 
143 Wise, Arthur Hastings B/M 1 W/F 
3W/M 
Aiken 2 2/1/2001  Executed 
144 Haselden, Jeffrey W/M W/M Lexington 11 2/13/2001  Life Imprisonment 
145 Shuler, Charles W/M 3W/F Orangeburg 1 3/22/2001  Died on Death Row 
146 Bryant, James Nathaniel B/M W/M Horry 15 6/25/2001 10/9/2004 Pending 
147 Crisp, Denisona W/M 2B/M Anderson 10 10/19/2001  Life Imprisonment 
148 Laney, Michael W/M 2B/F Greenville 13 10/19/2001  Life Imprisonment 
149 Moore, Richard Bernard B/M W/M Spartanburg 7 10/22/2001  Pending 
150 Wood, John Richard W/M W/M Greenville 13 2/16/2002  Pending 
151 Bowman, Marion B/M W/F Dorchester 1 5/23/2002  Pending 
152 Downs, William, Jr. W/M W/M Aiken 2 6/27/2002  Executed 
153 Sigmon, Brad Keith W/M W/M 
W/F 
Greenville 13 7/21/2002  Pending 
154 Binney, Johnathan Kyle W/M W/F Cherokee 7 11/14/2002  Pending 
155 Sapp, Jesse Waylon W/M W/M Berkeley 9 5/19/2003  Died on Death Row 
156 Vasquez, Angel Joe Pierre B/M W/M 
B/M 
Horry 15 10/5/2003  Life Imprisonment 
 
157 Roberts, Tyree Alfonso 
aka: Abdiyyah ben 
Alkebulanyahh 
B/M W/M 
B/M 
Beaufort 14 10/22/2003  Pending 
158 Northcutt, Clinton W/M W/F Lexington 11 11/14/2003 6/18/2009 Pending 
159 Morgan, Eric Dale W/M W/M Spartanburg 7 3/9/2004  Life Imprisonment 
160 Lindsey, Marion B/M W/F Spartanburg 7 5/24/2004  Pending 
161 Evans, Kamell Delshawn B/M W/M 
W/M 
Greenville 13 9/21/2004  Pending 
162 Evins, Fredrick B/M W/F Spartanburg 7 11/19/2004  Life Imprisonment 
163 Williams,  Charles Christopher B/M W/F Greenville 13 2/19/2005  Pending 
164 Allen, Quincy B/M W/M 
B/F 
Richland 5 3/18/2005  Pending 
165 Cottrell, Luzenski Allen B/M W/M Horry 15 4/6/2005 9/27/2014 Pending 
166 Mercer, Kevin B/M B/M Lexington 11 4/22/2006  Pending Resentencing 
167 Stanko, Stephen W/M W/F Georgetown 15 8/18/2006  Pending 
W/M Horry 15 11/19/2009 
168 Mahdi, Mikal D. B/M W/M Calhoun 1 12/8/2006  Pending 
169 Woods, Anthony B/M W/F Clarendon 3 12/8/2006  Pending 
170 Bixby, Steven Vernon W/M W/M 
B/M 
Greenwood 8 2/21/200714  Pending 
171 Finklea, Ron Oneal B/M B/M Lexington 11 9/6/2007  Pending 
172 Motts, Jeffrey Brian W/M W/M Greenville 13 12/4/2007  Executed 
173 Winkler, Louis Michael W/M W/F Horry 15 2/7/2008  Pending 
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  * The information in Appendix A was obtained from the reports 
completed by the trial judge in all cases in which a death sentence 
was imposed as required by S.C. Code § 16-3-25(A). See also State 
v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 219-42, 255 S.E.2d 799, 811-28 (1979) 
(including a template of the report as Appendix B to the opinion). 
Copies of the sentencing reports are on file with the authors.  
 
LEGEND FOR APPENDIX A: 
                  
1 Tried in Chester County 
2 Jury from Newberry County 
3 Tried in Union County 
4 Tried in Sumter County 
5 Jury from Greenwood County 
6 Tried in Berkeley County 
7 Tried in Pickins County 
8 Tried in Kershaw 
9 Jury from Lancaster County 
10 Tried in Aiken County 
11 Jury from Florence County 
12 Jury from York County 
13 Jury from Aiken County 
14 Jury from Chesterfield County 
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174 Bryant, Stephen C. W/M W/M 
W/M 
B/M 
Sumter 3 9/11/2008  Pending 
175 Torres, Andres Antonio H/M W/M 
W/F 
Spartanburg 7 10/23/2008  Pending 
176 Justus, Kenneth H. W/M W/M Dorchester 1 12/23/2008  Died on Death Row 
177 Inman, Jerry "Buck" W/M W/F Pickens 13 4/22/2009  Pending 
178 Dickerson, William Jr. B/M B/M Charleston 9 5/7/2009  Pending 
179 Rivera, Raymondeze B/M B/F Anderson 10 2/18/2010  Life Imprisonment 
180 Barnes, Steven B/M B/M Edgefield 11 11/17/2010  Pending Retrial 
181 Blackwell, Ricky Lee W/M W/F Spartanburg 7 3/16/2014  Pending 
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TOTALS FOR APPENDIX A:          
          
Race/Gender # % 
Black defendants sentenced to death 86 47.51% 
White defendants sentenced to death 93 51.38% 
Hispanic defendants sentenced to death 1 0.55% 
Native Americans sentenced to death 1 0.55% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing 
black victims 33 17.65% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing 
white victims 151 80.75% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing 
Asian victims 3 1.60% 
Black Defendants/White Victims 63 33.69% 
Black Defendants/Black Victims 22 11.76% 
Black Defendant/Asian Victim 2 1.07% 
White Defendants/White Victims 86 45.99% 
White Defendants/Black Victims 11 5.88% 
White Defendant/Asian Victim 1 0.53% 
Hispanic Defendant/White Victim 1 0.53% 
Native American Defendant/White Victim 1 0.53% 
Male defendants 180 99.45% 
Female defendants 1 0.55% 
Male Defendants/Female Victims 99 52.94% 
Male Defendants/Male Victims 87 46.52% 
Female Defendant/Male Victim 1 0.53% 
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APPENDIX B* 
South Carolina's Current Death Row 
(As of 12/31/2015) 
Name Defendant 
Race 
Victi
m 
Race 
County Original 
Sentence 
Date 
Time on 
Death Row 
(years) 
1 Singleton, Fred B/M W/F Newberry 9/17/1983 32.31 
2 Jones, Donald Allen B/M W/F Lancaster 2/8/1984 31.92 
3 Bell, William Henry, Jr. B/M W/M Anderson 3/14/1989 26.82 
4 Wilson, James William W/M 2B/F Greenwood 5/9/1989 26.66 
5 Sims, Mitchell W/M W/M Berkeley 5/13/1989 26.65 
6 Hughes, Mar-Reece B/M W/M York 9/22/1995 20.29 
7 Bennett, Johnny B/M B/M Lexington 10/19/1995 20.21 
8 Council, Donnie B/M W/F Aiken 10/23/1996 19.20 
9 Stone, Bobby Wayne W/M W/M Sumter 1/28/1997 18.93 
10 Starnes, Norman W/M W/M Lexington 4/25/1997 18.70 
11 Terry, Gary W/M B/F Lexington 9/21/1997 18.29 
12 Hughey, John Kennedy B/M 2B/F Abbeville 10/30/1997 18.18 
13 Aleksey, Bayan B/M B/M Orangeburg 9/1/1998 17.34 
14 Owens, Freddie B/M B/F Greenville 2/17/1999 16.88 
15 Simmons, Kenneth B/M B/F Dorchester 3/2/1999 16.84 
16 Robertson, James W/M W/
M 
York 3/27/1999 16.78 
17 Weik, John Edward W/M W/F Dorchester 6/21/1999 16.54 
18 Stokes, Sammie Louis B/M W/F Orangeburg 10/31/1999 16.18 
19 Bryant, James Nathaniel B/M W/M Horry 6/25/2001 14.53 
20 Moore, Richard Bernard B/M W/M Spartanburg 10/23/2001 14.20 
21 Wood, John Richard W/M W/M Greenville 2/16/2002 13.88 
22 Bowman, Marion, Jr. B/M W/F Dorchester 5/23/2002 13.62 
23 Sigmon, Brad Keith W/M W/
M 
Greenville 7/21/2002 13.45 
24 Binney, Johnathan Kyle W/M W/F Cherokee 11/14/2002 13.14 
25 Roberts, Tyree Alfonzo (aka Abdiyyah 
ben Alkebulanyahh) 
B/M W/
M 
Beaufort 10/22/2003 12.20 
26 Northcutt, Clinton Robert W/M W/F Lexington 11/14/2003 12.14 
27 Lindsey, Marion B/M W/F Spartanburg 5/24/2004 11.61 
28 Evans, Kamell Delshawn B/M 2 W/M Greenville 9/21/2004 11.28 
29 Williams, Charles Christopher B/M W/F Greenville 2/18/2005 10.87 
30 Allen, Quincy B/M W/
M 
Richland 3/21/2005 10.79 
31 Cottrell, Luzenski Allen B/M W/M Horry 4/6/2005 10.74 
32 Mercer, Kevin Jermaine B/M B/M Lexington 4/22/2006 9.70 
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* The information in Appendix B was obtained by comparing the 
information in Appendix A, Appendix C, Appendix E, Appedix F and 
information about relief granted in other proceedings maintained by 
Justic 360 and the authors. Cases in italics indicate the individual has 
been granted either guilt or penalty phase relief. These cases are either 
pending retrial or resentencing or have been appealed by the State to a 
higher court and the appeal remains pending. 
TOTALS: 
 
Race/Gender # % 
Black Defendants 26 57.78% 
White Defendants 18 40.00% 
Hispanic Defendants 1 2.22% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing black victims 11 23.91% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing white victims 35 76.09% 
Black Defendants/White Victims 17 36.96% 
Black Defendants/Black Victims 9 19.57% 
White Defendants/White Victims 17 36.96% 
White Defendants/Black Victims 2 4.35% 
Hispanic Defendant/White Victim 1 2.17% 
Male defendants 45 100.00% 
Female defendants 0 0.00% 
Male Defendants/Female Victims 24 52.17% 
Male Defendants/Male Victims 22 47.83% 
 
  
APPENDIX B* 
South Carolina's Current Death Row 
(As of 12/31/2015) 
Name Defendant 
Race 
Victi
m 
Race 
County Original 
Sentence 
Date 
Time on 
Death Row 
(years) 
33 Stanko, Stephen W/M W/F 
W/M 
Georgetown 
Horry 
8/18/2006 
11/19/2009 
9.38 
34 Mahdi, Mikal D. B/M W/M Calhoun 12/8/2006 9.07 
35 Woods, Anthony B/M W/F Clarendon 12/8/2006 9.07 
36 Bixby, Steven Vernon W/M W/
M 
Greenwood 2/21/2007 8.86 
37 Finklea, Ron Oneal B/M B/M Lexington 9/6/2007 8.32 
38 Winkler, Louis Michael W/M W/F Horry 2/8/2008 7.90 
39 Bryant, Stephen C. W/M 2W/M 
1B/M 
Sumter 9/11/2008 7.31 
40 Torres, Andres Antonio H/M W/
M 
Spartanburg 10/23/2008 7.19 
41 Inman, Jerry “Buck” W/M W/F Pickens 4/22/2009 6.70 
42 Dickerson, William, Jr. B/M B/M Charleston 5/7/2009 6.65 
43 Barnes, Steven B/M B/M Edgefield 11/17/2010 5.12 
44 Blackwell, Ricky Lee W/M W/F Spartanburg 3/17/2014 1.79 
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APPENDIX C* 
South Carolina Executions - List of Those Executed 
1976-2015 
Name Defenda
nt Race 
& Sex 
Victim 
Race & 
Sex 
County of 
Conviction 
Original 
Sentence 
Date 
Execution 
Date 
Time on 
Death Row 
(years) 
Execution 
Method 
Other 
1 Shaw, Joseph Carl W/M W/F 
W/M 
Richland 12/16/1977 1/11/1985 7.08 Electrocution  
2 Roach, James Terry W/M W/F 
W/M 
Richland 12/16/1977 1/10/1986 8.07 Electrocution Juvenile 
3 Woomer, Ronald W/M W/F Horry 7/20/1979 4/27/1990 10.78 Electrocution  
4 Gaskins, Donald Henry W/M B/M Richland 3/26/1983 9/6/1991 8.45 Electrocution  
5 Adams, Sylvester B/M B/M York 3/3/1980 8/18/1995 15.47 Lethal Injection Intellectual
ly Disabled 
6 South, Robert W/M W/M Lexington 11/17/1983 5/31/1996 12.55 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
7 Kornahrens, Fred W/M W/F 
2W/M 
Charleston 11/19/1985 7/19/1996 10.67 Lethal Injection  
8 Torrence, Michael W/M W/M Lexington 5/28/1988 9/6/1996 8.28 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
9 Bell, Larry Gene W/M W/F Saluda 2/27/1986 10/4/1996 10.61 Electrocution Competency to be 
exectued 
10 Lucas, Doyle Cecil W/M W/F 
W/M 
York 7/27/1983 11/15/1996 13.32 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
11 Middleton, Frank B/M B/F Charleston 2/4/1985 11/22/1996 11.81 Lethal Injection Intellectual
ly Disabled 
12 Elkins, Michael W/M W/F Jasper 3/30/1991 6/13/1997 6.21 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
13 Matthews, Earl B/M W/F Charleston 5/13/1985 11/7/1997 12.50 Lethal Injection  
14 Arnold, John W/M B/F Beaufort 2/9/1979 3/6/1998 19.08 Lethal Injection  
15 Plath, John W/M B/F Beaufort 2/9/1979 7/10/1998 19.43 Lethal Injection  
16 Roberts, Sammy David W/M 2W/M 
B/M 
Berkeley 1/19/1981 9/25/1998 17.69 Lethal Injection  
17 Gleaton, J.D. B/M W/M Lexington 10/7/1977 12/4/1998 21.17 Lethal Injection  
18 Gilbert, Larry B/M W/M Lexington 10/7/1977 12/4/1998 21.17 Lethal Injection Evidence of 
Intellectual 
Disability 
19 Truesdale, Louis B/M W/F Lancaster 12/11/1980 12/11/1998 18.01 Lethal Injection  
20 Smith, Andy Lavern B/M B/F 
B/M 
Anderson 1/17/1984 12/18/1998 14.93 Lethal Injection  
21 Howard, Ronnie B/M Asian/F Greenville 6/15/1986 1/8/1999 12.58 Lethal Injection  
22 Atkins, Joseph NA/M B/F 
W/M 
Charleston 6/28/1986 1/22/1999 12.58 Lethal Injection  
23 Drayton, Leroy B/M W/F Charleston 10/8/1984 11/12/1999 15.10 Lethal Injection  
24 Rocheville, David W/M W/M Spartanburg 7/15/1991 12/3/1999 8.39 Lethal Injection  
25 Young, Kevin Dean B/M W/M Anderson 5/22/1989 11/3/2000 11.46 Lethal Injection  
26 Johnson, Richard W/M B/M Jasper 2/15/1986 5/3/2002 16.22 Lethal Injection  
27 Green, Anthony B/M W/F Charleston 10/1/1988 8/23/2002 13.90 Lethal Injection  
28 Passaro, Michael W/M W/F Horry 8/17/2000 9/13/2002 2.07 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
29 Hill, David Clayton W/M W/M Georgetown 10/31/1995 3/19/2004 8.39 Lethal Injection  
30 McWee, Jerry W/M W/M Aiken 1/23/1994 4/16/2004 10.24 Lethal Injection  
31 Byram, Jason W/M W/F Richland 3/9/1995 4/23/2004 9.13 Lethal Injection  
32 Tucker, James N. W/M W/F Sumter 12/8/1993 5/28/2004 10.48 Electrocution  
33 Longworth, Richard W/M 2 W/M Spartanburg 9/10/1991 4/15/2005 13.61 Lethal Injection  
34 Wise, Arthur Hastings B/M 1 W/F 
3 W/M 
Aiken 2/1/2001 11/4/2005 4.76 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
35 Humphries, Shawn W/M W/M Greenville 8/9/1994 12/2/2005 11.32 Lethal Injection  
36 Downs, William, Jr. W/M B/M Aiken 6/27/2002 7/14/2006 4.05 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
37 Shuler, Calvin Alphonso B/M W/M Dorchester 11/12/1998 6/22/2007 8.61 Lethal Injection  
38 Hill, David Mark W/M W/M 
W/F 
B/F 
Aiken 2/14/2000 6/6/2008 8.32 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
39 Reed, James Earl B/M B/M 
B/F 
Charleston 6/9/1996 6/20/2008 12.04 Electrocution Volunteer 
40 Gardner, Joseph B/M W/F Dorchester 12/13/1995 12/5/2008 12.99 Lethal Injection  
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* The information in Appendix C has been systematically maintained by Justice 360 and the 
authors since the first modern South Carolina execution in 1985. It was confirmed by a similar list 
maintained by the Death Penalty Information Center (www.deathpenaltyinfo.org). 
TOTALS: 
 
Race/Gender # % 
Black Defendants 16 37.21% 
White Defendants 26 60.47% 
Native American Defendants 1 2.33% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing black victims 10 23.26% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing white victims 32 74.42% 
Defendants sentenced to death for killing Asian victims 1 2.33% 
Black Defendants/White Victims 11 25.58% 
Black Defendants/Black Victims 4 9.30% 
Black Defendant/Asian Victim 1 2.33% 
White Defendants/White Victims 20 46.51% 
White Defendants/Black Victims 6 13.95% 
Native American Defendant/White Victim 1 2.33% 
Male defendants 43 100.00% 
Female defendants 0 0.00% 
Male Defendants/Female Victims 25 58.14% 
Male Defendants/Male Victims 18 41.86% 
APPENDIX C* 
South Carolina Executions - List of Those Executed 
1976-2015 
Name Defendant 
Race & 
Sex 
Victim 
Race & 
Sex 
County of 
Conviction 
Original 
Sentence 
Date 
Execution 
Date 
Time on 
Death Row 
(years) 
Execution 
Method 
Other 
41 Williams, Luke, III W/M W/F 
W/M 
Edgefield 11/23/1993 2/20/2009 15.25 Lethal Injection  
42 Ivey, Thomas B/M W/M 
W/M 
Orangeburg 1/20/1995 5/8/2009 14.31 Lethal Injection  
43 Motts, Jeffrey Brian W/M W/M Greenville 12/4/2007 5/6/2011 3.42 Lethal Injection Volunteer 
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* The information in Appendix D was obtained from the reports completed by the trial 
judge in all cases in which a death sentence was imposed as required by S.C. Code § 
16-3-25(A). See also State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 219–42, 255 S.E.2d 799, 811–28 
(1979) (including a template of the report as Appendix B to the opinion). Copies of the 
sentencing reports are on file with the authors. 
** Aggravating circumstances removed from earlier version of the S.C. Code § 16-3-
20. 
  
APPENDIX D* 
South Carolina Death Senences 
(Listed by Aggravating 
Circumstances) 1977-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Name 
 
 
 
 
Senten
ce 
Date 
 
Rape/CSC 
 Assault - Ravish** 
 
Kidnapping 
Trafficking in 
Persons
 
Burglary 
 
Armed Robbery 
 
Armed Larceny 
 
House Breaking** 
 
Poison 
 
Drug Trafficking 
 
Torture 
 
Dismemberment 
 
Arson 
 
Prior M
urder 
 
Risk >1 
 
M
onetary Value 
 
Judicial Officer 
 
Agent 
 
Law Enforcement 
Law or Judicial  
OfficerFamily
 
2 M
urders 
 
Child < 11 
 
W
itness 
 
SVP 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Tucker, Richard 10/28/199 x  x  x           x         4 
Tyner, Rudolph 8/11/1978      x                   1 
Tyner, Rudolph 10/11/198      x                   1 
Vasquez, Angel Joe Pierre 10/5/2003   x   x               x    3 
Victor, William Keith 10/1/1988   x                      1 
Von Dohlen, Herman 5/28/1991      x                   1 
Weik, John Edward 5/29/1999     x      x              2 
Weldon, Dana 6/15/1986   x   x                   2 
West, Floyd 10/21/198      x                   1 
Whipple, James 2/18/1994 x     x                   2 
Williams, Charles 2/19/2005   x                      1 
Williams, George Allen 2/7/1997     x x                   2 
Williams, Luke, III 11/23/199                x     x    2 
Wilson, James William 5/9/1989                     x x   2 
Winkler, Louis Michael 2/7/2008     x                  x  2 
Wise, Arthur Hastings 2/1/2001     x                x    2 
Wood, John Richard 2/16/2002                   x      1 
Woods, Anthony 12/8/2006 x    x                    2 
Woods, Stanley Eugene 1983      x     x              2 
Woomer, Ronald (Horry) 7/20/1979 x  x                      2 
Woomer, Ronald (Colleton) 6/7/1981      x Ins         x         2 
Woomer, Ronald (Horry) 7/23/1981 x  x                      2 
Yates, Dale Roberts 5/2/1981      x                   1 
Young, Kevin Dean 5/22/1989      x                   1 
Young, Kevin Dean 6/12/1993      x                   1 
Total Per Aggravating 4 3 7 0 4 11 4 9 1 0 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 0 3 1 1 0  
Total Number of Single Agg. Cases: 83 
Average Number of Aggs. Per Case: 2.05 
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APPENDIX E* 
South Carolina Capital Direct Appeal Cases 
1977-2015 
Case Name Result 
State v. Gill ,  273 S.C. 190, 255 S.E.2d 455 (1979) Reversed-NT1 
State v. Shaw , 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979), cert denied , 444 U.S. 957 
(1979)2 
Affirmed3 
State v. Tyner , 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979) Reversed-S4 
State v. Gilbert , 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979)5 Reversed-S 
State v. Goolsby , 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E.2d 31 (1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 
1037 (1980) 
Reversed-S 
State v. Woomer , 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981) Reversed-S 
State v. Linder , 276 S.C. 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1981) Reversed-NT 
State v. Hyman , 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. denied , 459 U.S. 
1122 (1982) 
Affirmed 
State v. Gilbert , 277 S.C. 53, 283 S.E.2d 179 (1981), cert. denied , 456 U.S. 984 
(1982)6 
Affirmed 
State v. Adams , 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981) Reversed-NT 
State v. Plath , 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981)7 Reversed-S 
State v. Woomer , 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981) Reversed-NT 
State v. (James) Butler , 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982) Reversed-NT 
State v. Thompson , 278 S.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 581 (1982), cert. denied , 456 U.S. 
938 (1982) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Wardell) Patterson , 278 S.C. 319, 295 S.E.2d 264 (1982) Reversed-NT 
State v. Truesdale , 278 S.C. 368, 296 S.E.2d 528 (1982) Reversed-NT 
State v. (Horace) Butler , 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1 (1982), cert denied , 459 
U.S. 932 (1982) 
Affirmed 
State v. Sloan , 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982) Reversed-NT 
State v. Woomer , 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 317 (1982), cert. denied , 463 U.S. 
1229 (1983) 
Affirmed 
State v. Smart , 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982), cert. denied , 460 U.S. 1088 
(1983) 
Reversed-S 
State v. Koon , 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982) Reversed-S 
State v. Copeland , 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert denied , 460 U.S. 
1103 (1983)8 
Affirmed 
State v. Adams , 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E.2d 208 (1983), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 
1023 (1983) 
Affirmed 
State v. Spann , 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983), cert. denied , 466 U.S. 947 
(1984) 
Affirmed 
State v. Elmore , 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983) Reversed-NT 
State v. Plath , 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619 (1984)9 Affirmed 
State v. Yates , 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied , 462 U.S. 1124 
(1983) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Stanley) Woods , 282 S.C. 18, 316 S.E.2d 673 (1984) Reversed-NT 
State v. Stewart , 283 S.C. 104, 320 S.E.2d 447 (1984) Reversed-S 
State v. Gaskins , 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132 (1985), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 
1120 (1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. Singleton , 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E.2d 153 (1985), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 
1111 (1985) 
Affirmed 
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South Carolina Capital Direct Appeal Cases 
1977-2015 
Case Name Result 
State v. Koon , 285 S.C. 1, 328 S.E.2d 625 (1985), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 1036 
(1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Wardell) Patterson , 285 S.C. 5, 327 S.E.2d 650 (1984), cert. denied , 
471 U.S. 1036 (1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. Truesdale , 285 S.C. 13, 328 S.E.2d 53 (1984), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 
1009 (1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. Chaffee , 285 S.C. 21, 328 S.E.2d 464 (1984), cert. denied , 471 U.S. 1009 
(1985)10 
Affirmed 
State v. Lucas , 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E.2d 63 (1985), cert. denied , 472 U.S. 1012 
(1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. Skipper ,  285 S.C. 42, 328 S.E.2d 58 (1985), rev'd,  476 U.S. 1 (1986) Affirmed 
State v. Norris , 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985) Reversed-S 
State v. Damon , 285 S.C. 125, 328 S.E.2d 628 (1985), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 865 
(1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. South , 285 S.C. 529, 331 S.E.2d 775 (1985), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 888 
(1985) 
Affirmed 
State v. Elmore , 286 S.C. 70, 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985), rev'd in part and remanded , 
476 U.S. 1101 (1986) (per curiam) 
Affirmed 
State v. Plemmons , 286 S.C. 78, 332 S.E.2d 765 (1985), rev'd in part and 
remanded , 476 U.S. 1102 (1986) (per curiam) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Andrew Lavern) Smith , 286 S.C. 406, 334 S.E.2d 277 (1985), cert. 
denied , 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) 
Affirmed 
State v. Drayton , 287 S.C. 226, 337 S.E.2d 216 (1985) Reversed-NT 
State v. Peterson , 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800 (1985)11 Reversed-NT 
State v. (Donald) Jones , 288 S.C. 1, 340 S.E.2d 782 (1985), rev'd on other 
grounds,  479 U.S. 102 (1986) (per curiam) 
Affirmed 
State v. Middleton , 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) Reversed-NT 
State v. Stewart , 288 S.C. 232, 361 S.E.2d 789 (1986) Reversed-S 
State v. Patrick , 289 S.C. 301, 345 S.E.2d 481 (1986) Reversed-S 
State v. Pierce , 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986) Reversed-NT 
State v. Brown , 289 S.C. 581, 347 S.E.2d 882 (1986) Reversed-NT 
State v. Kornahrens , 290 S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986), cert. denied , 480 U.S. 
940 (1987) 
Affirmed 
State v. Arthur , 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E.2d 187 (1986) Reversed-S 
State v. (Raymond) Patterson , 290 S.C. 523, 351 S.E.2d 853 (1986), cert. denied , 
482 U.S. 902 (1987) 
Reversed-S 
State v. Riddle , 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987) Reversed-S 
State v. (Kamathene) Cooper , 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E.2d 441 (1986) Reversed-NT 
State v. Matthews , 291 S.C. 339, 353 S.E.2d 444 (1986) Reversed-S 
State v. Hawkins , 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987) Reversed-NT 
State v. Bellamy , 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987) Reversed-NT 
State v. (Alvin) Owens , 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987), cert. denied , 484 
U.S. 982 (1987) 
Affirmed 
State v. Atkins , 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987) Reversed-S 
State v. (Richard) Johnson , 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987) Reversed-NT 
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South Carolina Capital Direct Appeal Cases 
1977-2015 
Case Name Result 
State v. (Larry) Bell , 293 S.C. 391, 360 S.E.2d 706 (1987), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 
1020 (1988) 
Affirmed 
State v. Drayton , 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 
1079 (1988) 
Affirmed 
State v. Reed , 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987) Reversed-S 
State v. Cockerham , 294 S.C. 380, 365 S.E.2d 22 (1988) Reversed-NT 
State v. Middleton , 295 S.C. 318, 368 S.E.2d 457 (1988), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 
872 (1988) 
Affirmed 
State v. Howard , 295 S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert denied , 490 U.S. 
1113 (1989)12 
Reversed-S/Affirmed 
State v. Gathers , 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140 (1988), aff'd , 490 U.S. 805 (1989) Reversed-S 
State v. Plemmons , 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E.2d 871 (1988) Reversed-S 
State v. Brown , 296 S.C. 191, 371 S.E.2d 523 (1988) Reversed-NT 
State v. Diddlemeyer , 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988) Reversed-NT 
State v. Matthews , 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E.2d 587 (1988), cert. denied , 489 U.S. 
1091 (1989) 
Affirmed 
State v. Arthur , 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1988) Reversed-S 
State v. Cain , 297 S.C. 497, 377 S.E.2d 556 (1988), cert. denied , 497 U.S. 1010 
(1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Donald) Jones , 298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989), cert. denied , 494 
U.S. 1060 (1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Andrew Lavern) Smith , 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. 
denied , 494 U.S. 1060 (1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Raymond) Patterson , 299 S.C. 280, 384 S.E.2d 699 (1989), vacated , 
493 U.S. 1013 (1991) 
Affirmed 
State v. Elmore , 300 S.C. 130, 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989), cert. denied , 496 U.S. 931 
(1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. Victor , 300 S.C. 220, 387 S.E.2d 248 (1989) Reversed-NT 
State v. Caldwell , 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990) Reversed-S 
State v. Riddle , 301 S.C. 68, 389 S.E.2d 665 (1990) Reversed-S 
State v. Truesdale , 301 S.C. 347, 393 S.E.2d 168 (1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 
1074 (1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. Green , 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 881 
(1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Larry) Bell , 302 S.C. 18, 393 S.E.2d 364 (1990), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 
881 (1990) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Raymond) Patterson , 302 S.C. 384, 396 S.E.2d 366 (1990), vacated , 
500 U.S. 950 (1991) 
Affirmed 
State v. Atkins , 303 S.C. 214, 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990), cert. denied , 501 U.S. 1259 
(1991) 
Affirmed 
State v. Orr , 304 304 S.C. 185, 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991) Reversed-NT 
State v. Sims , 304 S.C. 409, 405 S.E.2d 377 (1991), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1103 
(1992) 
Affirmed 
State v. (William) Bell , 305 S.C. 11, 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991), cert. denied , 502 
U.S. 1038 (1992) 
Affirmed 
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Case Name Result 
State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) Reversed-S 
State v. Young , 305 S.C. 380, 409 S.E.2d 352 (1991) Reversed-S 
State v. Manning , 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), cert. denied , 503 U.S. 
914 (1992) 
Reversed-NT 
State v. (Richard) Johnson , 306 S.C. 119, 410 S.E.2d 547 (1991), cert. denied , 
503 U.S. 993 (1992) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Wilbert Ray) Davis , 306 S.C. 246, 411 S.E.2d 200 (1991) Reversed-NT 
State v. Wilson , 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 846 
(1992) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Tommy Lee) Davis , 309 S.C. 326, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992), cert. denied , 
508 U.S. 915 (1993) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Rebecca) Smith , 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496 (1992) Reversed-NT 
State v. Rocheville , 310 S.C. 20, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993), cert. denied , 508 U.S. 
978 (1993) 
Affirmed 
State v. Ray , 310 S.C. 431, 427 S.E.2d 171 (1993) Reversed-S 
State v. (Jonathan) Simmons , 310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993), rev'd , 512 
U.S. (1994) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Gene Tony) Cooper , 312 S.C. 90, 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994) Reversed-NT 
State v. Hall , 312 S.C. 95, 439 S.E.2d 278 (1994), cert. denied , 512 U.S. 1246 
(1994) 
Affirmed 
State v. Elkins , 312 S.C. 541, 436 S.E.2d 178 (1993), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1063 
(1994) 
Affirmed 
State v. Charping , 313 S.C. 147, 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993) Reversed-NT 
State v. Longworth , 313 S.C. 360, 438 S.E.2d 219 (1993), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 
831 (1994) 
Affirmed 
State v. Riddle , 314 S.C. 1, 443 S.E.2d 557 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1003 
(1994) 
Affirmed 
State v. Southerland , 316 S.C. 377, 447 S.E.2d 862 (1994), cert. denied , 513 
U.S. 1166 (1995) 
Affirmed 
State v. Franklin , 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 856 
(1995) 
Affirmed 
State v. Young , 319 S.C. 33, 459 S.E.2d 84 (1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1051 
(1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. Hudgins , 319 S.C. 233, 460 S.E.2d 388 (1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 
1096 (1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Richard) Tucker , 319 S.C. 425, 462 S.E.2 263 (1995), cert. denied , 516 
U.S. 1080 (1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. (James) Tucker , 320 S.C. 206, 464 S.E.2d 105 (1995) Reversed-S 
State v. Holmes , 320 S.C. 259, 464 S.E.2d 334 (1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 
1248 (1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. Nance , 320 S.C. 501, 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996), cert. denied , 518 U.S. 1026 Affirmed 
State v. Rogers , 320 S.C. 520, 466 S.E.2d 360 (1996) Reversed-S 
State v. (Luke) Williams , 321 S.C. 327, 468 S.E.2d 626 (1996), cert. denied , 519 
U.S. 891 (1996) 
Affirmed 
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State v. Van Dohlen , 322 S.C. 234, 471 S.E.2d 689 (1996), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 
972 (1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. McWee , 322 S.C. 387, 472 S.E.2d 235 (1996), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 
1061 (1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. Torrence , 322 S.C. 475, 473 S.E.2d 703 (1996) Affirmed 
State v. George , 323 S.C. 496, 476 S.E.2d 903 (1996), cert. denied , 520 U.S. 
1123 (1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Raymond) Patterson , 324 S.C. 5, 482 S.E.2d 760 (1997), cert. denied , 
522 U.S. 853 (1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. Whipple , 324 S.C. 43, 476 S.E.2d 260 (1996), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 
1045 (1996) 
Affirmed 
State v. (James) Tucker , 324 S.C. 43, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996), cert. denied , 520 
U.S. 1200 (1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. Humphries , 325 S.C. 28, 479 S.E.2d 57 (1996), cert. denied , 520 U.S. 
1268 (1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. Simpson , 325 S.C. 37, 479 S.E.2d 57 (1996), cert. denied , 520 U.S. 1277 
(1997) 
Affirmed 
State v. Ivey , 325 S.C. 137, 481 S.E.2d 125 (1997) Affirmed 
State v. Byram , 326 S.C. 107, 485 S.E.2d 360 (1997) Affirmed 
State v. Conyers , 326 S.C. 263, 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997) Affirmed 
State v. (Herman) Hughes , 328 S.C. 146, 493 S.E.2d 821 (1997), cert. denied , 
523 U.S. 1097 (1998) 
Affirmed 
State v. Bennett , 328 S.C. 251, 493 S.E.2d 845 (1997) Reversed-S 
State v. Manning,  329 S.C. 1, 495 S.E.2d 191 (1997) Reversed-NT 
Ray v. State , 330 S.C. 184, 498 S.E.2d 640 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 905 
(1998) (per curiam) 
Affirmed 
State v. Hicks , 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1022 
(1998) 
Affirmed 
State v. Powers , 331 S.C. 37, 501 S.E.2d 116 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1043 
(1998) 
Affirmed 
State v. (David Clayton) Hill , 331 S.C. 94, 501 S.E.2d 122 (1998), cert. denied , 
525 U.S. 1043 (1998) 
Affirmed 
State v. Ivey , 331 S.C. 118, 502 S.E.2d 92 (1998), cert. denied , 1075 U.S. 1075 
(1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Theodore) Kelly , 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998), cert. denied , 525 
U.S. 1077 (1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. George , 331 S.C. 342, 503 S.E.2d 168 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 
1149 (1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. Reed , 332 S.C. 35, 503 S.E.2d 747 (1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1150 
(1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. Ard , 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998) Affirmed 
State v. Gardner , 332 S.C. 389, 505 S.E.2d 338 (1998), cert. denied , 526 U.S. 
1022 (1999) (per curiam) 
Affirmed 
State v. Charping , 333 S.C. 124, 508 S.E.2d 851 (1998), cert. denied , 527 U.S. 
1007 (1999) 
Affirmed 
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State v. (James) Tucker , 334 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied , 527 
U.S. 1042 (1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. Council , 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 803 
(1999) 
Affirmed 
State v. Rosemond , 335 S.C. 593, 518 S.E.2d 588 (1999) Affirmed 
State v. Huggins , 336 S.C. 200, 519 S.E.2d 574 (1999) (per cuiam), cert. denied , 
528 U.S. 1172 (2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Mar-Reece) Hughes , 336 S.C. 585, 521 S.E.2d 500 (1999), cert. denied , 
529 U.S. 1025 (2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Roger) Johnson , 338 S.C. 114, 525 S.E.2d 519 (2000), cert. denied , 531 
U.S. 840 (2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. Rogers , 338 S.C. 435, 527 S.E.2d 101 (2000) Affirmed 
State v. Quattlebaum , 338 S.C. 441, 527 S.E.2d 105 (2000) Reversed-NT 
State v. Terry , 339 S.C. 352, 529 S.E.2d 274 (2000), cert denied , 531 U.S. 882 
(2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. Hughey , 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 524 (2000), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 946 
(2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. Shafer , 340 S.C. 291, 531 S.E.2d 524 (2000), rev'd , 532 U.S. 36 (2001) Affirmed 
State v. Starnes , 340 S.C. 312, 531 S.E.2d 907 (2000) Reversed-NT 
State v. Locklair , 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 
1093 (2000) 
Affirmed 
State v. McClure , 340 S.C. 403, 537 S.E.2d 273 (2000) Reversed-S 
State v. Aleksey , 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000), cert. denied , 532 U.S. 1027 
(2001) 
Affirmed 
State v. (William) Kelly , 343 S.C. 350, 540 S.E.2d 851 (2001), rev'd , 534 U.S. 
246 (2002) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Jeffrey) Jones , 343 S.C. 562, 541 S.E.2d 813 (2001) Reversed-NT 
State v. Shuler , 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 997 
(2001) 
Affirmed 
State v. Stokes , 345 S.C. 368, 548 S.E.2d 202 (2001) Affirmed 
State v. (Freddie) Owens , 346 S.C. 637, 552 S.E.2d 745 (2001) Reversed-S 
State v. Burkhart , 350 S.C. 252, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002) Reversed-NT 
State v. Stone , 350 S.C. 442, 567 S.E.2d 244 (2002) Reversed-S 
State v. Passaro , 350 S.C. 499, 567 S.E.2d 862 (2002) Affirmed 
State v. Weik , 356 S.C. 76, 587 S.E.2d 683 (2002), cert. denied , 539 U.S. 930 
(2003) 
Affirmed 
State v. Shafer , 352 S.C. 191, 573 S.E.2d 796 (2002)13 Reversed-S 
State v. Shuler , 353 S.C. 176 , 577 S.E.2d 438 (2003) Affirmed 
State v. Haselden , 353 S.C. 190, 577 S.E.2d 445 (2003) Reversed-S 
State v. Tench , 353 S.C. 531, 579 S.E.2d 314 (2003) Affirmed 
State v. (James Nethaniel) Bryant , 354 S.C. 390, 581 S.E.2d 157 (2003) Reversed-NT 
  State v. Moore , 357 S.C. 458, 593 S.E.2d 608 (2004) Affirmed 
State v. Wise , 359 S.C. 14, 596 S.E.2d 475 (2004), cert. denied , 543 U.S. 948 
(2004) 
Affirmed 
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State v. (Kenneth) Simmons , 360 S.C. 33, 599 S.E.2d 448 (2004), cert. denied , 
543 U.S. 1124 (2005) 
Affirmed 
State v. Downs , 361 S.C. 141, 604 S.E.2d 377 (2004) Affirmed 
State v. (David Mark) Hill , 361 S.C. 297, 604 S.E.2d 696 (2004), cert. denied , 
544 U.S. 1020 (2005) 
Affirmed 
State v. Holmes , 361 S.C. 333, 605 S.E.2d 19 (2004), rev'd , 547 U.S. 319 (2006) Affirmed 
State v. Wood , 362 S.C. 135, 607 S.E.2d 57 (2004), cert. denied , 545 U.S. 1132 
(2005) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Freddie) Owens , 362 S.C. 175, 607 S.E.2d 78 (2004) Reversed-S 
State v. Binney , 362 S.C. 353, 608 S.E.2d 418 (2005), cert. denied , 546 U.S 852 
(2005) 
Affirmed 
State v. Crisp , 362 S.C. 412, 608 S.E.2d 429 (2005) Reversed-NT 
State v. Vazquez , 364 S.C. 293, 613 S.E.2d 359 (2005) Affirmed 
State v. Sapp , 366 S.C. 283, 621 S.E.2d 883 (2005), cert. denied , 547 U.S. 1133 
(2006) 
Affirmed 
State v. Bowman , 366 S.C. 485, 623 S.E.2d 378 (2005), cert. denied , 547 U.S. 
1195 (2006) 
Affirmed 
State v. Sigmon , 366 S.C. 552, 623 S.E.2d 648 (2005), cert. denied , 548 U.S. 909 
(2006) 
Affirmed 
State v. Morgan , 367 S.C. 615, 626 S.E.2d 888 (2006) Vacated-Roper 14 
State v. Laney , 367 S.C. 639, 627 S.E.2d 726 (2006) Reversed-S 
State v. Bennett , 369 S.C. 219, 632 S.E.2d 281 (2006), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 
1061 (2006) 
Affirmed 
State v. Roberts , 369 S.C. 580, 632 S.E.2d 871 (2006), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 
1279 (2007) 
Affirmed 
State v. Evans , 371 S.C. 27, 637 S.E.2d 313 (2006) Affirmed 
State v. Burkhart , 371 S.C. 482, 640 S.E.2d 450 (2007) Reversed-S 
State v. Lindsey , 372 S.C. 185, 642 S.E.2d 557 (2007), cert. denied , 552 U.S. 917 
(2007) 
Affirmed 
State v. Northcutt , 372 S.C. 207, 641 S.E.2d 873 (2007) Reversed-S 
State v. (James Nethaniel) Bryant , 372 S.C. 305, 642 S.E.2d 582 (2007), cert. 
denied , 552 U.S. 899 (2007) 
Affirmed 
State v. Evins , 373 S.C. 404, 645 S.E.2d 904 (2007), cert. denied , 552 U.S 1046 
(2007) 
Affirmed 
State v. Stone , 376 S.C. 32, 655 S.E.2d 487 (2007) Affirmed 
State v. Cottrell , 376 S.C. 260, 657 S.E.2d 451 (2008) Reversed-NT 
State v. Stanko , 376 S.C. 571, 658 S.E.2d 94 (2008), cert. denied , 555 U.S. 785 
(2008) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Freddie) Owens , 378 S.C. 636, 664 S.E.2d 80 (2008), cert. denied , 555 
U.S. 1141 (2009) 
Affirmed 
State v. Mercer , 381 S.C. 149, 672 S.E.2d 556 (2009), cert. denied , 558 U.S. 843 
(2009) 
Affirmed 
State v. Woods , 382 S.C. 153, 676 S.E.2d 128 (2009) Affirmed 
Mahdi v. State , 383 S.C. 135, 678 S.E.2d 807 (2009) Affirmed 
State v. (Jeffrey) Jones , 383 S.C. 535, 681 S.E.2d 580 (2009) Reversed-NT 
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APPENDIX E* 
South Carolina Capital Direct Appeal Cases 
1977-2015 
Case Name Result 
State v. (Quincy) Allen , 386 S.C. 93, 687 S.E.2d 21 (2009), cert. denied , 560 
U.S. 929 (2010) 
Affirmed 
State v. (Charles Christopher) Williams , 386 S.C. 503, 690 S.E.2d 62 (2010), 
cert. denied , 131 S. Ct. 230 (2010) 
Affirmed 
State v. Flinklea , 388 S.C. 379, 697 S.E.2d 543 (2010) Affirmed 
State v. Bixby , 388 S.C. 528, 698 S.E.2d 572 (2010), cert. denied , 131 S. Ct. 
2154 (2011) 
Affirmed 
State v. Winkler , 388 S.C. 574, 698 S.E.2d 596 (2010), cert. denied , 131 S. Ct. 
2155 (2011) 
Affirmed 
State v. Starnes , 388 S.C. 590, 698 S.E.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied , 131 S. Ct. 
1504 (2011) 
Affirmed 
State v. Torres , 390 S.C. 618, 703 S.E.2d 226 (2010) Affirmed 
State v. (Stephen) Bryant , 390 S.C. 638, 704 S.E.2d 344 (2011) Affirmed 
State v. Justus , 392 S.C. 416, 706 S.E.2d 668 (2011), cert. denied , 132 S. Ct. 
1095 (2012) 
Affirmed 
State v. Dickerson , 395 S.C. 101, 716 S.E.2d 895 (2011), cert. denied , 132 S. Ct. 
1972 (2012) 
Affirmed 
State v. Inman , 395 S.C. 539, 720 S.E.2d 31 (2011), cert. denied , 133 S. Ct. 219 
(2012) 
Affirmed 
State v. Rivera , 402 S.C. 225, 741 S.E.2d 694 (2013) Reversed-NT 
State v. Stanko , 402 S.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d 708 (2013), cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 
247 (2013) 
Affirmed 
State v. Barnes , 407 S.C. 27, 753 S.E.2d 545 (2014) Reversed-NT 
 
1 "Reversed-NT" means the South Carolina Supreme Court found the error in the guilt-or innocence phase 
of the proceedings and ordered an entirely new trial. 
2  This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants. 
3  "Affirmed" means the South Carolina Supreme Court found no reversible error in the case. 
4 "Reversed-S" means the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction(s) but 
vacated the death sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. 
5  This reversed the death sentence of two defendants. 
6  This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants. 
7  This reversed the death sentence of two defendants. 
8  This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants. 
9  This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants. 
10  This affirmed the death sentence of two defendants. 
11  This reversed the death sentence of two defendants. 
12  One of the defendants was affirmed and one was given a new sentencing hearing. 
13  Case decided on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. 
14  Sentence vacated under Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting execution of juveniles). 
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Guilt Phase         
Prosecutorial Misconduct 13  2     15 
Instructional Error 17   1 1   19 
Evidentiary Error 19 1      20 
Juror Qualification or 
S l i
2 2      4 
Other 14     1  15 
Inadequate Assistance of   7     7 
New Evidence       1 1 
Penalty Phase         
Prosecutorial Misconduct 16  3     19 
Instructional Error 25 3 3   1  32 
Evidentiary Error 18 4 9 3    34 
Juror Qualification or 3       3 
Other 11       11 
Inadequate Assistance of   19     19 
Proportionality        0 
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APPENDIX G* 
Post-Conviction Relief Reversals in South Carolina Courts 
1977-2015 
Thompson v. Aiken , 281 S.C. 239, 240, 315 S.E.2d 110, 110 (1984) 
Chaffee v. State , 294 S.C. 88, 91, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987)1 
Damon v. Aiken , 86-CP-38-211 (S.C. 1st Cir. C.P. June 22, 1987) 
Smith v. Aiken , 86-CP-04-995 (S.C. 10th Cir. C.P. June 26, 1987) 
Owens v. McKellar , 88-CP-26-605 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. Apr. 5, 1988) 
Cain v. Evatt , No. 90-CP-13-382 (S.C. 4th Cir. C.P. May 4, 1995) 
Whipple v. Moore , No. 97-CP-26-417 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. Dec. 10, 1998) 
Holmes v. Moore , No. 96-CP-46-966 (S.C. 16th Cir. C.P. Jan. 15, 1998) 
Southerland v. State , 337 S.C. 610, 617, 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1999) 
Hudgins v. Moore , 337 S.C. 333, 339, 524 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1999) 
Patterson v. State , No. 98-CP-32-0097 (S.C. 11th Cir. C.P. Sept. 23, 1999) 
Ray v. State , (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. May 30, 2001) 
Kelly v. State , No. 99-CP-42-1174 (Oct. 6, 2003) 
Hall v. Catoe , 360 S.C. 353, 365, 601 S.E.2d 335, 342 (2004) 
Von Dohlen v. State , 360 S.C. 598, 614, 602 S.E.2d 738, 746 (2004) 
Charping v. State , No. 99-CP-32-2316 (S.C. 11th Cir. C.P. Sept. 3, 2004); 
Huggins v. State , No. 00-CP-26-1446 (S.C. 15th Cir. C.P. July 18, 2005) 
Riddle v. Ozmint , 369 S.C. 39, 47-48, 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006) 
Simpson v. Moore , 367 S.C. 587, 608, 627 S.E.2d 701, 712 (2006) 
Nance v. Ozmint , 367 S.C. 547, 558, 626 S.E.2d 878, 883 (2006) 
Locklair v. State , No. 01-CP-42-0272 (S.C. 7th Cir. C.P. Aug. 22, 2006) 
Ard v. Catoe , 372 S.C. 318, 336, 642 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2007) 
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William Hicks (reversing conviction pursuant to Brady )2 
Ted Powers (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper )2 
Herman Hughes (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper )2 
Robert Conyers (vacating sentence pursuant to Roper )2 
Tommy Lee Davis (vacating sentence pursuant to Atkins )2 
 
1  This reversed the sentence of two defendants. 
2 Orders granting relief were not available. The reason for reversal was confirmed 
with attorneys who formerly represented the individual clients in post-conviction 
proceedings. 
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* The information in Appendix H was obtained from the South 
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense Capital Trial Division, 
which has systematically maintained a list of all potential capital trials 
since the Division's creation in 2008. Cases in bold indicate the Capital 
Trial Division was appointed to represent the defendant. 
 
APPENDIX H* 
Pretrial Death Penalty Case Outcomes 2008-2015 
 
Defendant 
 
County 
 
Outcome 
Year of 
Disposition 
43 Kelly, Theodore Spartanburg Plea to life1 2012 
44 Lynch, Kenneth Lexington LWOP2 2012 
45 McClure, David Barnwell LWOP/Plea1 2012 
46 Nance, Robert Florence LWOP4 2012 
47 Nelson, Robert Dillon DP 2012 
48 Owens, Shawn Oconee LWOP/Plea 2012 
49 Stewart, Thomas J. Chesterfield DP Withdrawn 2012 
50 Whatley, Julian Richland LWOP/Plea 2012 
51 Barker, Montez Florence LWOP/Plea 2013 
52 Brown-Kelly, Tyler Berkeley 45 years/Plea 2013 
53 Daise, Earnest Stewart Beaufort LWOP 2013 
54 Delaine, Fonnelze Travis Florence LWOP/Plea 2013 
55 Hall, Joshua Anthony Laurens LWOP/Plea 2013 
56 Haselden, Jeffrey Lexington LWOP/Plea1 2013 
57 Patrick, Quentin Sumter DP Not 2013 
58 Rivera, Raymondeze Anderson LWOP/Plea4 2013 
59 Rosemond, Andre Spartanburg DP 
1 6
2013 
60 Vasquez, Angel Horry LWOP1 2013 
61 Blackwell, Ricky Lee Spartanburg Death 2014 
62 Cottrell, Luzenski Allen Horry Death4 2014 
63 Carter, Stephon Aiken LWOP/Plea7 2015 
64 Evins, Frederick Spartanburg LWOP/Plea1 2015 
65 Huggins, Titus Horry LWOP/Plea1 2015 
66 Nickolas Miller Kershaw LWOP/Plea 2015 
67 Rogers, Timothy D. Dorchester 50 Years/Plea1 2015 
68 Philips, Jacob Charleston LWOP/Plea8 2015 
69 Smith, Cass Franklin Cherokee LWOP/Plea 2015 
 
 
1 Resentencing 
2 Judge sentencing 
3 Prosecutor elected not to seek death in a death eligible 
case considered by the Trial Division to be a likely 
capital case 
4 Retrial 
5 Death penalty withdrawn due to intellectual disability 
6  Found incompentent to stand trial 
7  Plea offered and accepted after jury selection 
